

1616

THE
FIRST PART OF
THE DISQVISITION
OF TRVTH, CON-
CERNING POLITI-
CAL AFFAIRES.


HANLED
In two seuerall Sections.

The first whereof (by way of
certaine questions probleme-wise
propounded and answered) con-
sisteth of foureteene Chapters.


Written by Henry Wright.



LONDON,
Printed by NICHOLAS OKES,
1616.



Библиотека
Горьковской
областной
библиотеки



TO THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE, SIR
JOHN FOLLES, Knight,
Lord Maior of the Citie of
LONDON.

AND

To the Right Worshipfull the
rest of the Aldermen his
Brethren, &c.

{ Right Honourable

&

{ Right Worshipfull,


Although I very well know,
that no man (almost) in
handling any politique dis-
course, could ever satisfie the expecta-
tion of such as were skilfull, orl vn-

A 3 skil-

The Epistle Dedicatore.


skilfull in the exercising, acting, and managing of such affaires: the one, because they could not vnderstand: the other, for that they were (most what) too curious, neuer regarding any thing more, then the use thereof for seruing the time present: yet for the great respect I haue euer borne to the Honourable Citie of London (wherein I haue had the most part of my liuing and abiding,) and (in particular) to your Honour, and Worships the worthy gouernours ther of (whom I know to be iudicious, yet free from curiositie) I haue aduentured to propound to the world my priuate conceipts touching that subiect. May it please your Honour and Worships therefore (till better grow) to accept these first fruits of my barren-braine, and by your fauourable


The Epistle Dedicatore.

rable approuing of them, to protect & defend them against the snarlings of blacke-mouth'd Momists, who are euer more ready to carpe at other mens writings, thento amend them, or to suffer any of their owne once to view the light. The matter I borrowed (as you may perceiue) out of the best and most approued Authours and Historiographers: the forme, frame and dispositi-
on of the worke is mine owne, which (such as it is) together with my best seruices, I commend to your Honour and Worships, and your selues to the grace of God, and so rest,

By your Honour, and Worships
euer ready to be commanded,

Henry Wright.





THE SVMMARY AND HEADS OF THE Chapters contained in this first *part of the Disquisition of Truth,* concerning Political affaires.

SECT. I. CHAP. I.



P Religion, and the force thereof: wherenpon and how it commeth to passe, that there be such and so many diuersties and differences of opinions concerning the same.

SECT. I. CHAP. 2.

Of the best forme of a Common-wealthe.

SECT. I. CHAP. 3.

Of the Prince, Court, Courtiers, &c.

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SECT. I. CHAP. 4.

Of a Kingdome: How it may be got, how kept, how it may be increased, how made lasting and durable; and lastly, how it may bee lost, or ouer-thrown, by hatred, contempt, &c.

SECT. I. CHAP. 5.

Of Councell, Councillors, and the choosing of them: Of running middle courses. The great good which redoundeth to a Prince being well-advised, and how he may discerne good counsel from bad advise.

SECT. I. CHAP. 6.

Of Example: the use and abuse thereof in a Commonwealth.

SECT. I. CHAP. 7.

Of wits, manners, and dispositions of diuers Countries, Nations, and Cities, as well free as seruile.

SECT. I. CHAP. 8.

Of benefits, and when to be bestowed: of ingratitude, and how a friend may bee purchased, that a man may trust to.

SECT. I. CHAP. 9.

Of estimation and credit: of authoritie publique and private: of Seueritie, strictnesse of gouernement, Constancie, Pietie and Prouidence.

SECT. I. CHAP. IO.

Of glory and renowne, the desire thereof, profitable to
the

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the Common-wealth. Of power and greatness, and the acquiring thereof. Of ambition and unlawfull desire of reigning. Of eminent places, and their being free (for the most part) from practises of treasons, &c.

SECT. I. CHAP. II

Of Studies, dispositions, &c. and whence the diuersity thereof may proceed. Of learning, &c. how necessary for a Prince. Of intelligence, and the use and benefit thereof.

SECT. I. CHAP. 12.


Of peace, and the conditions thereof. Of the state and affaires of Princes. Of Embassages, Embassadours, &c.


SECT. I. CHAP. 13.

Of discord and faction, whereof they take their beginnings, and of the nourishing, or not nourishing of them in a common-wealth.

SECT. I. CHAP. 14.

Of Sedition, mutinie, and defection of the greatest part of the people in a State, and of standing Newstrall, or part-taking.





The chiefe Authors whom I haue
followed in compiling of this
worke, *Alphabetically*
set downe.

A

A Vgustine.
Aristotle.
Amianus.
Attius.
Aulus Politicus.
Aristophanes.

B

The Bible.
Petrus Bembus.

C

Quintus Curtius.
Philippus Cominæus.

B 3. Capitolinus

Capitolinus.

Marcus Tullius Cicero.

Cladianus.

Philippus Camerarius.

D

Dant an Italian Poet.

Dio Cassius.

Diodorus Siculus.

Demosthenes.

E

Euripides.

F

Valerius Flaccus.

G

Franciscus Guicardinus.

Aulus Gellius.

H

Horatius.

Herodotus.

I

Iuuenall.

Iosephus.

Lactantius

L

Lactantius.

Lucretius.

Lucanus.

Titus Liuius.

M

Machiavell.

Valerius Maximus.

O

Ouidius.

P

Plato.

Plutarchus.

Phauorinus, Philoſo-
phus.

Polybius.

Plautus.

Plinius,

Pindarus.

Pacuvius.

Q

Quintilianus.

Henricus

R

Henricus Ranzovius.

S

Salustius.
Stobæus,
Seneca,
Suetonius,

T

Tholozanus,
Thucidides,
Cornelius Tacitus,

V

Velleius,
Vegetius,

X

Xenophon;

Z

Zimera Problem.

THE



THE FIRST
PART OF THE DIS-
QVISITION OF TRUTH,
Concerning Politicall Affaires.

SECT. I. CAP. I.

Of Religion, and the force thereof: wherupon, and how it commeth to passe, that there be such, and so many, diuersities, and differences, of Opinions, concerning the same.

I. It may bee demanded wherefore the w^{ise}^ast^a Law-giuers did euer conclusionally determine, that the care of Religion, and all holy things should belong unto the Prince?

^a Licurgus. So-
lon. Epaminon-
das, Numa, Xe-
nophon.

As it because they thought it fit, that that which was ^b best, and most worthy to bee had in honour, should bee honoured of the best, and him who bare the chiefeſt rule in the Monarchy, or State? Or was it

^b Diogenes apud Stobaeum.



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The first Part of the

^c Xenophon
Pædia Cyri. l. 8.

^a Arist. Rhet.
ad Alex.

^b Lactantius
de ira Cap. 12.

it rather, because they wisely considered, that if their Subiects feared God, they would bee the more loath to do any thing which might redound to the hurt of one another, or attempt anything against the Prince? Or was it not for these causes alone, but rather likewise, ^d for the augmenting and enlarging of their Empire and Dominions, as though the Diuine Powers were more prone, propitious, and fauourable, towards those that serue them, then vnto any others? Or to conclude, was it for the generall good of a Common-wealth, as a certaine ^e Diuine plainly protested, who held that Religion, and the Feare of God, were the surest bands for conseruing of Humane Society?

2 It may further bee demanded, how farre a Prince ought to take care of matters concerning Religion?

O Vght hee (as some do thinke) to take care for the examination of the truth or falsehood of that Religion which hee professeth, and in all Ecclesiasticall matters to take vpon him to bee chiefe Judge and Determiner of them, according to his owne municipall Lawes? Or ought hee rather (as others imagine) to bee a defender onely of that Religion which formerly hath beeene receiued, or afterwards is propounded or obtruded vnto him?

^f The opinion of all Princes and States not subiect to the Pope.

^g The opinion of the Church of Rome and her adherents.

^f This latter may be thought an vnjust limitation, that any Prince, or State, should bee so curbed: and as touching the former, others thinke that a Prince hath no free power, or authority, to constitute or determine

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3

determine Ecclesiasticall busynesse, but that by bare permission onely, hee may haue a meere inspection into them: Which monstrous Opinion, in a Treatise (almost ready to come forth) I haue refuted: Evidently prouing that the Church, being a part of the State, it cannot bee without apparant danger to the same, to admit of forraigne Iurisdiction in managing matters Ecclesiasticall, but that such affaires ought alwaies to bee ordered by those who beare the Soueraignety, or some other, by their appointment, within the same State.

3 It may bee further demanded, wherefore the ^h Ro- <sup>b Liu. lib. 7.
hist. Rom.</sup>
manes alwaies confessed and acknowledged that they were more obliged and indebted to Numa than to Romulus.

This question (Right Honourable) out of the Romanes owne History is thus resolued: Affirming that *Romulus* (though founder of their Citty) left little or nothing vnto them, but their names to be called Romanes: But *Numa* (being the chiefe bringer in of Religion) perpetuated the same, and seemed to giue vnto them their very essence and being, and (as it were) to cause the prosperous successse of their State. For *Romulus* (saith the History) brought in the forme of a Common wealth, which was likely not to be durable, but might end with himselfe: But his Successor *Numa*, vpon the bringing in the continuall practise and exercise of Religion, did in such wise forme and frame the

The first Part of the

Common-wealth, that though himselfe should shortly die, yet there was left an euident meane and way to make it durable for many ages.

4 To the same purpose it may be demanded, wherefore the ¹ Romanes did make more account of Religion then all other Nations?

¹ Liu. lib. 10.
Hist. Rom.

VV As it because they plainly saw, that the setting Religion in the State, was the firmeſt prop they could rely vpon, for the vpholding, conseruing, and perpetuating of their Common-wealth, and that it would serue most fitly for the bringing in of Military Discipline, and Armes, to which they were moſt addi&ed, and without which they iudged their State could not stand? Or was it rather, for that they vnder this pretence (as thoſe who knew how to make vſe of Religion) did practise it more fortunately, and with better ſuccesse then others, to retaine and keepe thoſe which were good in their allegiance and obedience, and to curbe and reſtraine thoſe who were ill diſpoſed from committing euill, or perſiſting and continuing in their

^k Liu. lib. 3. lewd courses: as likewiſe to ^k pacifie the ſeditious, circa legem Te-¹ reconcile ſuch Subiects as were iuſtly offendē
^{rentiam.}

¹ Liu. lib. 3. circa creationem tri-^m retaine their Military Discipline, and keep their bulorum plebis Souldiers in good order, ⁿ get credite and autho-
consulari digni- tate.

^m Liu. lib. 5. rity to their Commanders: enterprise warres, and

ⁿ Liu. lib. 10. to bring them to a happy end?

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5 Againe, it may bee demanded to the same purpose, wherefore the Romanes, euен in their greatest streights and difficulties did rather use the pretext and colour of religion, to expedite and helpe them-selues, then any other meanes whatsoeuer.

WAs it because ^o they were perswaded that the Common-people did rather iudge by the shadowes then the substances of things? Or was it not for that cause alone, but rather for that they found by experience, that men are more throughly moued, and thinke themselues faster tyed vpon an^P oath taken (which hath his dependancie vpon Religion) then by any Lawes or Statutes whatsoeuer?

^o Francise.
Guicciardin.

^P Liu.lib.3.

6 It may further bee demanded wherefore in former times men (generally) were more religious then they are in these dayes?

WAs it because that in those elder times there was not that contempt of Religion, and neglect of God & his seruice, as is now in these moderne dayes? Or was it rather, because in those more happy times, it was held altogether vnlawfull for any man to make what construction he list of an oath when hee had taken it, and thereout to frame rules of liuing to himselfe, according to his owne liking; but to fashion his life and manners rather to

C 3

such

The first part of the

such lawes as were giuen, and imposed vpon him
to obserue?

7 It may finally be demanded, wherefore (seeing there
is but one truth) there are at this day so many and
sundry opinions about Religion, euen among Christi-
ans themselves.

Is it because the Clergie themselves in diuers
poynts disagree, being distracted into factious,
and wrting and disputing one against another;
which the rude and ignorant multitude once see-
ing, do thereby take vpon them to dispute of *Divi-
nitie*, to establish their fond and foolish opinions in
matters of *Religion*, which in no wise belonged vnto
them to meddle withall? Or may it bee, for that
sometyme yong Schollers, either in yeares, learning
or discretion taking vpon them to preach, teach, or
write, doe propound false or vnsound *Doctrine* to
the people: whose corrupt opinions once set a-
broach (as though it were a shaine for them to
change them vpon more mature deliberation into
better) do continually bestirre themselves, and em-
ploy their wits, rather to confirme, then amend
their errors? Or is this the reason rather, for that
the followers of any Sect whatsoeuer, study to tread
in their first Teachers steps, and obserue such cour-
ses and customes as formerly haue beene prescribed
vnto them?

Sect. I. Chap. II.

Of the best forme of a Commonwealth.

I It may bee demanded, wherefore according to many mens opinions, the Monarchy, or sole rule of one, ought to be preferred before other formes of gouernement?



It because that^a Monarchy is the most ancient kinde of gouernment, seeing that the name of Monarchy and Empire was first in the world? Or is it because this kinde of gouernement best agreeth to^b nature, as is to be seene by all, or the

most of all other creatures, in whom this image and shadow of one to rule ouer the rest may plainly appeare? Or is it because it is most agreeable to^c reason, that the body of an Empire being but one, should likewise be swayed by the discretion of one sole Ruler? Or is this rather the reason, because that neither in a^d popular estate, where many gouerne, nor in an Aristocracie, where a few sway the scepter, there can be possible any long concord and agreement among them? Or is it because that both in^e Democracies and Aristocracies it hath bin euer obserued,

^a Cic. de legibus
lib. 3. Iustinus
Historicus lib. 1
in initio.

^b Salust in Epistles.

^c Tacit. I. Annal

^d Tacit. 4. Annal

^e Tacit. I. Annal
Liu. lib. 5.

that

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This was ordinary in the Ro
mane-state: so
is it at this day in the Venetian
state, as Pet.
Bembus reporteth in his hi-
story of that state.

that in all difficult businesses they were glad to aban-
don the former kinde of gouernment, and conferre
the absolute power, strength and authoritie vpon
one onely, who should dispose of all things accor-
ding to his owne good liking? Or may this bee the
reason, for that *Monarchie* doth approach, come
neere, and euен resemble the Maiestie and simili-
tude of the diuine *Regencie*? or is it for that in a *Mo-
narchie* the order of lawes, the execution of iustice,
& all seemly proportion in doing any thing, is more
easily kept and obserued, then in *Democracie*, or *Ari-
stocracie*? Or may this likewise be the reason, for that
in case the gouernment swaied by one, shold grow
into ^f tirany, it were much better to endure the yoke
of one Tyrant, then of many? Or finally, may this be
the reason, that whereas the gouernement of the
State is conferred vpon many, & few, or none of
them respect the commonon good, but their owne
profite? Wherupon it commeth to passe, that one
of them falling out with another, the Commonwealth
is in danger of ship-wracke, it being much
more easie for one then for many to bee disposed
to goodnesse.

^b The opinion
of Solon de Re-
pub. Attica up-
on which very
ground, hee
framed the De-
mocracie of the
Athenian Com-
mon-wealthe.

2 In the next place it may be demanded, wherefore (ac-
cording to other mens opinions) the *Democracie*,
(or rule of many, and those of the people) is counted
for the best forme of gouernment?

I Sit by reason of that ^h equalitie which is obser-
ued & kept where the rule of the people beareth
sway?

^f Zimara in
Problem.

ⁱ Idem ibidem.

sway? when all are subiect to the lawes alike, and Magistrates placed by common suffrage, who judge according to the lawes, and the exact rule thereof, referring all their counsels and consultations to the good of the Common-wealth, and become accountable to the same for the administration and gouernement of such Cities, Townes, &c. as are committed to their charge? Or is it because that in a *Democracie* the ⁱ go-
uernement is more easie, meeke, and gentle, as the Orator would haue it? Or may this rather bee the reason, for that ^k many ioyned together, can better iudge of all matters then one alone. For it may very well bee thought, that in euery one of those many, there are certaine sparkes of *Vertue*, and excellencies of gifts, which concurring and put all together, must needs make an absolute iudgment.

3. It may be further demanded, wherefore diuers men (and those taken to haue beeone of the wifest) haue fauoured an *Aristocracie*, affirming that to bee the best forme of gouernement.

WAs it because they thought it very like-
ly, that the ^l counsels and consultations of the best men, excelling others in virtue and wisdome, shoulde the best and most auailable, and beneficall to the weale-publique? Or was it because they found by experience, that the *Aristocraticall* state was more ^m durable then any other forme of gouernment? *Aristocracies* hauing

ⁱ Demosthenes
de Repub. Attica.

^k Buchananus o-
pinion de iure
regni apud Sco-
tos.

^l Petrus Bern-
bas in his Ve-
netian History.

^m The *Aristo-*
craticall go-
uernments of
the Spartans
lasted 800.
yeares. The
Venetian state
hath lasted a-
boue 1100.
yeares with-
out any nota-
ble trouble,
tumult, or al-
teration.

euer great store of good wits, which may bee fitted and accomodated to all times and occasions, better then other formes of gouernement? Or might this rather bee their reaſon, because they obſerued that this forme of gouernement was not ſo ſubieſt to ⁿ alteration, or to grow into tyranny? ^{a Arist. Polit. 5.} For to ſpeake as they would haue the thing to be, [◦] though theſe few of the *Clarissimi* who ſway the gouernement, be naturally ambitious; notwithstanding when they ſee and conſider that all the authoritie is in their owne hands, and by reaſon thereof that they ſurpaſſe and excell the rest of their people, they content themſelues (for the moſt part) with this prerogatiue, and ſo raife no tumults, or ſtirre vp any troubles whereby the Common-wealthe might bee vexed or diſquieted for their ambitious humors.

And thus (Right Honorable) you ſee how that as euery one moſt fancied and affected this, or that kinde of gouernement: ſo they yeelded reaſons for the maintaining of their opinions? Wherein (in my conceit) they haue miſt the Cuiſhion, and vpon good grounds (as I hope) I may argue againſt them all. And thus for Argu-ment ſake I reaſon againſt their Monarchy.

Euery Monarch is either tied to rule, according to the lawes of the kingdome hee poſſeffeth, or he is not; If he be not bound, then all men will confeſſe with me, that that Monarchy may eaſily degenerate, and grow into tyranny. But if the Mo-
narch bee tied to obſerue lawes, nothing letteth
(not.)

^{a Arist. Polit. 5.}
◦ The opinion
of Machiauel,
lib. I. Disputat.
Cap. 5.

(notwithstanding) but that forme of Commonwealth may not bee durable, 'especially when the kingdome commeth by succession. ¶ For very sel-dome falleth it out, that to a wise and godly Father, a Sonne of that stampe, and endowed with like vertues, should succeed. Now, wheras by the peruerse, carelesse, or bad carriage of the Monarch toward his people, the manners of his subiects are once corrupted, it must of necessitie follow, that either the lawes are of small force, or none at all. And so farewell to that forme of government.

^P Dantes Poëta
Italus.

Against their *Democracie*, I this auerre, or (rather) finally determine, That if any good Coun-cels or Decrees come from the people, they proceed from them rather by meere chance, and accidentally; then for any prime or principall intention of the Councellers. For the people being driuen by some extreame necessity, to runne such and such courses, or put in practise those or these counsels, or being furthered by some memorable accident falling out in the nicke (as we say) may oftentimes decree things well and wisely, otherwise it is impossible for them so to doe? For they know not (for the most part) what they would haue, they aske what they know not, and when they haue obtained what they asked, by and by they spurne, kicke at it, and despise it: so that the prouerbe in them, and of them, is true, and euer will bee verified; *The people is a beast of many heads, wanering and envious.* So that I may very safely

The first part of the

conclude, that this forme of gouernment is worst
of all.

Against the *State Aristocraticall*, I this affirme,
that experience hath made it manifest to the
world, that those, who for a while haue iustly and
vprightly gouerned the Common-wealth, not
long after haue abused their power and authori-
ty to the gathering of riches, and getting posses-
sions of lands into their hands, insomuch that
they haue growne ambitious, earnestly thirsting
after priuate retengē, and the fulfilling of their
owne filthy lusts and appetites, as appeared plain-
ly in the *Aristocracie* of the *Romanes*, when after
they grew weary to be gouerned by *Consuls*, and
had set vp the *Decemvirate*, in the beginning of
the second yeare of their gouernment, they were
inforced to change that state into a *Democracie*,
because the *Decemviri* ruled so villanously. A-
gaine, it is recorded by antiquitie, that the sonnes
of vertuous parents, who were, and did succeede
in diuers gouernements, became extreme inso-
lent, common lechers, and spend-thrifts of those
patrimonies which their carefull parents had left
vnto them: Vpon which grounds I conclude,
That the *Aristocraticall* gouernment cannot stand
long firme, and stable, much lesse to bee perma-
nent and durable.

¶ These things then being, as I haue said, and conside-
ring that euery forme of gouernmēt is so subject to
change & alteration, it were wel worth the labour to
make

make a true Disquisition of this nice point, to wit, what forme of government were fitteſt for euery Kingdome and Country, whereby the welfare thereof might bee procured and continued.

To determine this question (*Right Honourable*) were a very hard taske to be vndertaken and performed of any man, yet because I haue taken vpon to discourse of this ſubieſt, I will in briefe ſhow your Lordship my opinion therein.

And firſt, I am verily perſwaded, that this, or that forme of gouernement, whether already eſtabliſhed, or to be brought in, and eſtabliſhed, in any Kingdome or Country, doth chiefly depend vpon the nature and diſpoſition of that Kingdome or Country, into which it hath bene already, or is to be brought: For it would be a very hard matter to bring a free forme of gouernment into that Country, who haue bene uſed to liue vnder a Monarch, as contrariwise, to reduce that people, to liue vnder the obedience and command of one absolute Ruler, who haue uſed to liue free of thēſelues, & to bee gouerned by their owne Lawes. The Easterne Countries not enduring to brooke the *Aristocraticall* or *Democraticall* State, were euer deuoted to liue vnder one ſole Monarth. On the other ſide, no forme of government would please the *Athenians* and *Heluetians* (whom at this day wee call *Switzers*) but a *Democracy*: None the *Lacedemonians* but an *Aristocracy*. The *Syracusians* affected a tyranicall forme of gouernement: Neither

could any of these people euer bee perswaded to forsake that forme of gouernment which they had once chosen: Nay, which is more, they did with such deadly and implacable hatred, prosecute all those who erected, or set vp any other kinds of Policies to bee gouerned, and to gouerne by, that wheresoever, and whensoeuer, they became Conquerours, they altered and abrogated, that forme of Gouernement, and brought in their owne forme.

Secondly, I vtterly deny all right formes of Common-wealthes, as the *Monarchy*, *Aristocracy*, and *Democracy*, to bee absolute and perfect: much lesse do I hold that any goodnesse can be in a *Tyranie*, *Oligarchy*, or *Ochlocracy*; For these last related, by reason of the multitude of euils which accompany them, are of, and in themselues alwaies euill, the Magistrates neuer regarding the common-good but their owne ends: The former likewise, although in themselues they are good (for that in all of them, the chiefe good of the Common-wealth, or State, either is, or ought to be sought) yet accidentally, they many times become euill; as well for that they last not long, as that they so easily degenerate.

To conclude therefore, I hold that forme of Common-wealth to bee best, which is compouned of the temper of all these, or at leastwise is so mixed of a *Monarchy* and *Aristocracy*, that one (indeed) for the Maiesty of the State should bee the chiefe Commander, but his power should be gouerned

gouerned, and his Councils ordered by the de-
creees and wisedome of the Senate: For by this
meanes, the Prince should retaine his splendor
and dignity, the Senate their power and authori-
ty, and the people their lawfull liberty.

S E C T. I. C H A P. III.

Of the Prince, Court, and Cour- tiers, &c.

I It may bee demanded why priuate men, can neuer
well and rightly iudge of the affaires of Princes?



S it because they exactly
^a know not the matters of State, the ends of Princes,

Guicchardine.

or how farre this, or that businesse, effected, or neg-
lected, doth concerne them?

Or may this rather bee the
reason that ^b forasmuch as

Idem.

the counsels, purposes, and designes of Princes,
differ so farre from the drifts and courses of pri-
uate men, it is impossible that the selfe-same pro-
jects should be auailable to them both? For it
(most what) so falleth out, that although matters
of State, determinations of businesses, and the
commodities or discommodities which may be
expected

expected to arise thereof, should be knowne as well to priuate men, as to Princes themselues, their applications, censures, and iudgements, notwithstanding touching the premisses, would be diuers, as their first ends and intentions were, which they had propounded to themselues.

2 In the next place it may bee demanded, wherefore, as wee commonly reade in Histories, as out of Tacitus and others, that that man, whose aide and helpe a Prince hath made vse of to bring him to the Crowne, within a while after is neither liked nor loued of that Prince, but either is fed with the smoake of innovation, or made shorter by the head?

IS it because that some Princes being naturally suspicious, do esteeme the faith of those to be fickle to them, which they haue proued to haue beene to the damage of others? Or is not that the reason, but this rather, that the very sight of them whose helpe they haue vsed to their rising, groweth odious vnto them, for that it seemeth to vp-braide them with the basenesse of their former meane fortunes? Or may it not be so neither, ^{c Philipus co-} but for that it is grieuous vnto some Princes to remember that they owe any thing, or that they are any waies beholding to their Subiects?

3 It may further bee demanded, how that Prince, who hath bereaued another of his Kingdome, might

might behauie himselfe to enjoy his new-got Empire
with safety?

Shall hee effect this, if hee^a affect him whom he hath so spoyled, with new fauours and benefites, endeuouring thereby to reconcile him, and binde him fast vnto him? But it is to bee feared, that old iniuries will hardly bee forgotten, by collating and bestowing of new benefites upon the wronged, especially if the greatnessse of the iniuries, exceede the rate of the benefites, as it falleth out commonly in the case of Kingdomes.

Or shall he bring this about the rather, if he^c murther, and kill, all those whom he imagineth to stand in his way, or whom hee standeth in doubt of, least in time they may become his enemies? But if he take these courses, he must needs fall into some great mischiefe; for he shall ingulfe himselfe in the vast Ocean of the peoples hatred, and thereby weaken his owne power against the time he should haue most occasion to vse it.

4 It may further bee demanded, why it so much importeth Princes, and great men, to be cautelous that they do not injury, or reproach any man?

IS it for that hee who is wronged of those who are infeminent place, and authority, perciuing himselfe to bee daily and hourelly shot at, and noted for the same, grieueth the more therat, and so sets vp his rest to take a sharp reuenge? Or ought

E they

This was the
error of Ser-
nius Tullius
King of the
Romanes, who
Tarquinius Si-
perbus slew.

This was the
practise of Se-
limus, the Tur-
kish Emperor,
who being but
a yonger bro-
ther, poysoned
Baizet his fa-
ther, made a-
way Corcute and
Acomat his two
brethren, &c.
So dealt Rich.
the 3. with his
two nephewes
the sonnes of
Edward the 4.
with the Duke
of Buckingham
likewise, and
others.

f Philipus Co-
minaeus.

^s *comineus.* they to be cautelous for this cause likewise, ^s least if the wronged hauing formerly retained vnto them, or made any dependency vpon them, shold vpon any trust committed vnto him, pay them home, in neglecting, or vtterly ouerthrowing their chiefeſt businesſes?

5 It may further be demanded, why it greatly importeth a Prince, to bee Vertuous, Honourable of his word, iuft, and of good Example among all men, as well Forreigners, as Domestiques?

ⁿ Xenophon in Pædia Cyri. Is it for that he may be thought vnſit ^h to gouern, who is not better euery way then those who are to bee gouerned? Or is it not for that cause onely, but for that ⁱ his good name and fame likewise at home, and abroad is greatly blemished and stained, if the course of his life and dealings bee not currant? Or ought hee to bee ſuch an one for the better ſtablithing of his Kingdome alſo? ^k For where there is no shame, care of doing of *Justice, Sanctity, Piety, & keeping of promise,* that kingdom muſt needs bee vnſtable, and the State tottering.

^j Sen. I. de Cle-
menzia. ^k Sen. Thieſt. 6 It may be the ſame purpose further demanded, why a Prince ought to be iuft, to make ſpeciall reckoning of the administration thereof equally to his Subiects, ey, to do iuftice upon himſelfe, if hee desire to be held for a good Prince?

^l Plato in Polit. Is it for that ^l a Lawleſſe Principallity, and loſſe-
gouernement is yokeſome to euery one (especial-
ly

ly of the better sort) so that they do not delight, or haue any desire to liue vnder it? Or is it for that the constant and strict obseruation, and administration of Iustice, doth stablish and strengthen a Kingdome, as the^m Oratour well perceiued, who said that Iustice and Equity were the true conseruators of Common-wealthes and Cities? Or is it not onely for that iustice doth stablish a Kingdome, but for that it doth truely make a kingdome to be a Kingdome, giuing vnto it his very essence and being, whereby it is, that which it is? For take away Iustice, and what are Kingdomes but great Robberies? as well said theⁿ learned Diuine.

^m Cic. Parad.

^u August. de
Ciuit. Dei lib. 6.

8 It may further be demanded, why many Princes are very fearefull, suspiciois, and iealous of their estates?

IS it because that^o Kingdomes are commonly subiect to treacheries? Or is this rather the reason, for that the^p nature of most Princes is prone to feare, and be iealous of their Estates? as well said the Poet, ^q Kingdomes and Mariages brooke no riuals.

^o Attius.

^p Sen. Oedip.

^q Sen. in Agam.

9 It may further bee demanded, wherefore all credit, countenance, honors, and authority in Court, are for the most part slippery, and not to be trusted vnto?

HAppeneth it thus by reason of the Fates vn-certainty (as it pleaseth the^r Historian to set downe) ^{r Tacit. 3. AR-}

downe) who auerreth, that Court-fauours, euen by decree of the destinies, are not alwaies lasting?

^{c Tacit. I. An-} ^{naliuim.} Or might this rather be the reason, for that Cour-

tiers credites are (commonly) ypheld by others, and not by their owne strengths? Or not so nei-
ther, but for that these things thus fall out through the fault of the Princes, their Maisters, whom they serue, whose wils and pleasures as they are
^{e Salust. In-} ^{gurth.} ^t vehement for the time, so they are very changeable, and oftentimes contrary to them-
selues?

^{u Sen. in Hip-} 10. Seeing that the "Court is so slippery a place, that polito.

a man shall hardly get fast footing: It may fitly bee demanded, by what Compasse a Courtier should saile, that hee may bee without all dan-
ger of shipwracke, whereby either his life may bee hazarded, his goods diminished, or his ho-
nour blemished?

SHall he attaine vnto those ends, if he shew him-
selfe dutifull, obsequious, and respectiuе of his

^{x Tacit. I. An-} Prince, as it pleased the ^x Historian to affirme?
^{mal.}

For by how much the seruant in the iudgement of his Maister, shall bee held more desirous and ready to please him, then another shall; by so much the more hee shall bee aduanced to ho-
nours and riches? Or may hee compasse his de-

^{y The saying sires the better, if he be} ^{of Constantine} seruiceable likewise, and not like the moathes, and caterpillars of the Great

Court? Or may hee rather further his intents,

if he be bold spirited also? For shamefastnesse is
an ill seruitour in a Princes Palace, as well said
the^z Poet. Or shall he be cautelous likewise, ta-^z *Sen. in Hippol.*
king heed that whatsoeuer he well doth or perfor-
meth, he do it as^a though he seemed not to do it,^a *Velleius. 11.*
and without boasting or bragging? Or (to auoid
envy) shall he learne to^b dissemble, cloake, and^b *Tacit. 16. An-*
obscure his owne vertues, and proper gifts? Or^{nal.}
shall hee, being any wayes aduanced by his Prin-
ces faours, like the Moone,^c acknowledge (of-
tentines) that he hath receiued all the light of his
glory, and grace of his rising, from that Sunne his
maister? Or shall hee striue and endeavour to be-
come very^d patient, and^e extreame wary like-
wise? He must be very patient, that he may beare
iniuries the better, & not flie out, or run into pas-
sion vpon euery crosse he shall meet withall, or
such distastes as shall be giuen him. He must bee
cautelous, least he be taken in the traps of his fai-
ned friends, or secret, or open professed enemies.

II It may further be demanded, why it is better to
live with, and serue a prudent and wise Prince,
then a foolish?

IS it because that a^f foolish Prince being (for^f *Philip. Comi-*
the most part) very suspitious, thinketh that e-^{natus. lib. 4.}
very of his seruants goeth about to deceiue him,
which to an Honest minde must needes be a great
corrosive? Or is it for that a^g foolish Prince not^g *Idem ibidem.*
vnderstanding his owne affaires, cannot make

difference of good seruice from bad, whereupon it commeth to passe, that his loue is turned into hatred, and his hatred into loue in a moment? Or is it not for these reasons onely, but for this likewise, that ^h those seruants which liue vnder a wise Prince, haue moe meanes affoorded them to retaine their maisters fauour, if they once haue had it, or to recouer it if they haue lost it, then it is possible they can haue, who liue vnder an Ideot, or foolish Prince? For no man almost dealeth in any thing with the Prince himselfe, but with his seruants, whom he changeth as often as he putteth on a cleane shirt.

ⁱ This was wel
seen in the
Duke of little
Brittaine, who
vsed onely Pe-
ter Landoyes.

I 2 To the same purpose it may further be demanded wherefore (notwithstanding) many Courtiers bane rather chosen to liue in the Courts of some great Prince, though a foole, then in the Palace of a lesse potent Prince, though never so wise.

^k Lucas de Pen-
na.

^l Egisippus cum
alijs, ut refert
Guic.

I 3 Sit because that ^k it is true libertie (as some suppose) to liue vnder the command of a potent Prince? Or is it rather, as others affirme, for that the seruitors seruices are graced and beautified by the greatnessse and super-eminent dignitie of their maisters?

I 3 Seeing that none are borne Artists it may be demanded, what manner of Courtier is to be deemed and esteemed to be the better Crafts-maister in managing affaires of State?

ISh he the man who is ^m furnished with the knowledge of diuers tongues, well seene in Histories of the lawes of his owne and other Countries, that is religious, hath a quicke wit, a ripe iudgement, a fluent tongue, a grane stile, & is an excellent pen-man? Or is he rather to be so accounted, who is ⁿ smooth-tongued, gorgeously apparrelled, a great feast-maker, an artificiall cosouner, a deepe dissembler, a whoore-maister, tale-bearer, flatterer, a priuy-whisperer, and one that is giuen to all kinde of villanie?

^m Guicchard.

ⁿ Guic. & Tacit
3. Annal.

14. It may further be demanded, what might bee the best meanes wherby Princes may free themselues, from being abused by flatterie?

May they effect this if they beware and take heed that they ^o grow not into contempt with their people? Or shall they bring their purpose better about, if they sit often in counsell, and touching those things which they propound to be consulted vpon, doe shew themselues ^p patient in hearing the truth, that their people may understand that they will not be offended, if they freely speake their mindes, and confidently deliuere that which is true? Or may this likewise further their intents, if vpon the ^q perciuing and finding out of some or other, who for some sinister respects (though towards themselues) haue held their peace, or forborne to speake the truth, they do either shew themselues to be greatly offended with them, or seuerely punish them?

^o Tholoz de Re-
pub.lib.22.cap.8

^p Plut. Apotheg.

^q Machiauel his
doctrine in his
Prince.
Cap.23.

S E C T. I. C H A P. I I I.

Of a Kingdome: How it may be got, how kept, how it may be increased, how it may be made lasting or durable: And lastly, how it may bee lost, or ouer-throwne by hatred, contempt, &c.

I | It may be demanded, by what wayes and meanes any Principalitie may be gotten, or conquered.

^a Quintius Curtius. lib. 6.



S it to be atchieued by ^a foraigne Armes, as it happened to Alexander, when hee had ouer-throwne Darius at Arbella? For after that victory, he neuer vsed in the full conquest of Asia, or other kingdomes, any other but foraigne forces, for the most part. Or is it rather to be gotten by an home-bred Army, seconded by the vertue and the manhood of the Leaders, and Captaines, as it fell to the lot of ^b Cyrus, Romulus, and

^b Xenophon.

and Theseus? Or may it bee attained by forraigne force also, seconded by Fortunes fauours, as it happened to Francis Sforzia, and Borgia Caesar? Or may it bee gotten by the putting in practise of some notorious and desperate designe, as it happened to Agathocles? Or may it he compassed by the fauour of the Citizens, as Nabides got his dominion?

2 In the next place it may bee demanded, how any Principality being once gotten, may be safely kept.

May this be effected if the Prince proue industrious, and accomodate himselfe to make and take aduantage of such accidents and occasions as time will continually affoord him, and in all other things to imitate and follow the steps of his Auncestors? Or may it be effected, if he never giue any offence to those, whose helpe he vsed in getting his dominion, but satisfie them according to their desires and hopes (if it be possible) as they haue conceiued of their owne worths? Or may he this way rather attaine therunto, if finding treason intended against him, he should most severely punish it, for terrour to the rest? Or may it this way be effected, if vpon the obtaining of his dominion, he^c destroy all the bloud Royall, issues and allies, of the former Prince, and then obserue the Countrey customes without changing their lawes? Or may this rather bee effected, if hee that hath once gotten the soueraignty, remoue his seat

^c The barbarous and inhumane practise of the Turkes at eury change of Prince.

F thither,

thither, and make his continuall residence in his new dominion? Or may this yet rather bee effected, if the Prince send Colonies into his new-gotten kingdome, or maintaine garrisons both of horse and foote, in the frontier townes? Or may hee better bring this to passe, if (after conquest made) dealing courteously with them, hee retire himselfe, and accept of an annuall pension, in the name of a tribute, leauing onely some small company behinde him, rather to nourish and encrease his subiects good opinion of him, then for any other end or purpose? or may he effect this the better, if he altogether should change their lawes and customes, and translate them to other remote places in the same kingdome, then those which before they inhabited? or may this rather be the way to purchase the fauour and good opinion of the Senators, or commons, hauing them alwayes addicted to his fortunes, taking vpon him valiantly and couragiouly to defend those of his partie; against the other faction? or were not this the better course, to stand vpon his owne guard, hauing an army euer in a readinesse to chasten his subiects if they should rebel? Or finally, what if the

^a This did *cre-*
sus among the
Lidiāns, as *Po-*
lib. reporteth.

^c This was the
practise of the
Romans in sen-
ding their Pre-
tors.

^d Conquerour should dispoyle the conquered of
their weapons, and other meanes of defence or
offence?

3 It may further be demanded, how a new-got King-
dome may be enlarged?

S Hall this be attained vnto, if the ^e Conquerour shew

shew himselfe milde & gentle to his new subiects, thereby to allure the hearts of the neighbour borderers, to take a liking of his manner of gouernment? Or may it rather be effected, if ^f a great many of wise and warlike Princes do stil succeed one another in the selfe-same gouernement? Or may this be better done, if the conqueror haue a great care that *Military discipline* be alwaies vsed within his territories? Or should he rather go this way to worke, to ^g demolish the walles of the neighbour Cities, and cause the inhabitants to remoue their dwellings into his territories? Or shall he friendly invite all strangers to come into his dominions, giuing them letters of safe conduct, and securing them of their dwelling safely vnder his protection? Or shall he combine with diuers neighbouring Cities, ioyning themselues with them as associats, so as the name of the Empire and gouernment, as likewise the authoritie of leuying of warre, may euer remaine with him, and bee proper vnto him? Or shall he make those whom hee hath conquered to ^h become vassals and slaues vnto him? Or might this be effected, if certaine Cities making ⁱ league among themselues, that they will all be gouerned, and with equall dignities, and respect, should draw in other Cities to affect that kind of gouernment, and so to ioyne in the same league and amitie with them?

^f This fell out in the Macedonian Monarchie.

^g This & such like practises were the Romans.

^h Thus dealt the Spartans, Venetians and Florentines with them whom they conquered.

ⁱ The practise of the Switzers at this day.

4. It may further be demanded, which might bee the best way to make a state durable and lasting?

[¶] All these things were fore-seene by Lycurgus, the Lacedamonian Law-giuere.

SHall this be brought to passe, if by lawes it bee prouided for, vnder paine Capitall, that [¶] no man should affect the Gouvernement? Or may it better bee effected, if the Prince being strong of himselfe, shall yet giue testimony to his neighbour Princes, that hee is not ambitious, nor seeketh by leuying of Armes, to enlarge his Dominions to any of their detrimentes? Or shal hee doe it yet the better, if by idlenesse, and vaine pleasures hee suffer not the mindes of his subiects to bee corrupted, or that they shoule grow too much effeminate?

5 Considering that Kingdomes are strengthened as well by awfull Armes, as bright shining Virtue, it may bee demanded, by what kinde of force a Kingdome may best bee preserued, and made durable.

SHall it bee made firme and stable by hauing an Armie euer in a readinesse, rather to offend then defend, according to the counsell of the Emperour Seuerus; which he gaue to his sons,

[¶] Agree among your selues, enrich the Souldier, and contemne all others? Or shall this bee the better way to make it stable, if the Prince^m build many Forts, Towers, Citadels, Sconces, &c. within his Territories?

^m So did the Florentines to keepe Pisa and Francis Sforzia to conserue Millaine, but not to much purpose.

6 Seeing that hatred once conceiued against a Prince by his subiects, is the next way to bereave him of his Crowne, it may bee demanded, how the Prince

Prince may run into such hatred, and what meanes
hee might best vse to avoid it?

May hee runne into this hatred by his owne ^{n Mach. de Re-}
^{n boundlesse ambition, seeking to bring in-}
to bondage, and the great desires of his Citizens
to continue free? Or may hee come hated of his
Subiects, by reason of ^o the iniuries hee hath of-
fered them, either in seeking their liues, touching ^{o Mach. de Re-}
their honours, or preying vpon them for their ri-
ches? Or rather may it this way come to passe that
hee be hated, for that he hath ^p giuen cause to the ^{p Cic. Phillip. 2.}
Subiects to feare him, least he do them a mis-
chiefe? For, to feare, desire of reuenge is a per-
petuall companion. And this prouerbe is most
true, whom a man feareth, him hee hateth; whom
he hateth, he would gladly bee rid of? Or may this
bee the reason hee runneth into such hatred, for
that hee is ^q vicious; as cruell, couetous, sacrili-
gious, &c.

^{q Tholoz. de Re-}
^{pub.lib. 22.}

¶ It may bee further demanded, how the inflicting
of seuere punishments vpon offenders, may bee
freed from hatred?

^{r Sen. de Clem.}

SHall the Prince free himselfe therefrom, if hee
bee slow to punish delinquents, and thereby
giue testimony to the world, that his intent is ra-
ther to heale, and bind vp a soare, then to launch
and make it bleed by the arme of Justice? Or shall
hee this way free himselfe, if hee neuer punish,

^t *Sen. de Clem.* but^f when the safety of the Common-wealth calleth vpon him so to do, or at least his Subiects be so perswaded? Or shall hee this way rather bee freed, if hee^t neuer exact to take punishment of delinquents in an angry mood? Or may he this way auoide his Subiects hatred, if hee^u shew not any signes of reioycing, when hee inflicteth punishment vpon offendours, as though he thirsted after bloud, or were delighted with the shedding of it? Or rather may this be his way, that when many haue offended, hee do not^x now and then call them to account, as hee listeth, holding them in a perpetuall feare, but take his aduantage against all, and punish all forthwith? Or rather by this way may he be freed therefrom, by not devising any new kind of punishments, but inflicting those which haue beene in use, according to old and ancient custome of the Country? Or may he this way likewise free himselfe, if hee be very sparing in punishing of delinquents, and when he doth it, hee might bee thought to command it to bee inflicted against his will, but never to bee a spectator thereof? Or finally, may hee thus free himselfe therefrom, if to please his subiects, hee diuert the force of his fury another way, ^y caus-
^z *Tacit. 13. Annal.* ing such as haue beene his counsellours, and per-
swaders to wrong the Common-wealth, to taste the cup of his choler, by inflicting seuere pu-
nishment vpon them, or deliuering them into the peoples hands to be tormented?

8 It may further be demanded how a Prince may free himselfe of that hatred which hee hath purchased, by vexing his Subjects with Impositions, Taxes, Tallages, &c. which are commonly grievous to them to beare?

May this be done if the Prince perswade the people^z that if they will liue in peace and out of danger, that it is altogether necessary they indure such impositions, which if they should not, it were impossible for them to liue in safety, or the State to bee durable? For^a peace is not purchased but by Armes, nor Armes maintained but by Souldiers well paid, nor can the Souldier be paid without leuying of Subsidies? Or shall the Prince free himselfe, if hee command the gatherers of such Impositions, that they^b neither by force, nor fraude, exact more of the Subject, then anciently hath beeene accustomed to be paid? Or shall hee rather this way auoide their hatred, if sparingly, as iust occasion inforceth him, hee impend and lay out such treasure, as hath beeene leuied by Subsidies, that his Subjects may see and perceiue, that hee is but a Steward, for the good of the Common-wealth, and no riotous spender, or exhauster of the treasure so gathered: or that he hath any desire to conuert any of it, to his owne vse, or ends? Or shall hee thus rather free himselfe, by taking of a course, that^c iust and vniiforme contribution be made according to euery mans

^z Tacit. 13. Annal.

^a Tacit. 4. hist.

^b Idem. Ibid.

^c Plin. Paneg.

mans ability, neuer by fauour sparing one man, that the burthen may lye the heauier vpon another mans shoulders?

¶ It may further be demanded, how, and by what meanes, a great and potent Subiect, may auoide and shunne, the hatred of his Prince?

May this be effected, if this great Noble man make himselfe first odious to the people? Or shall hee better effect it, if hee shew himselfe very dutifull and obsequious to his Prince, praising all his good deeds, and sayings, and craftily dissembling whatsoeuer is bad in him? Or shall hee attaine therevnto, if hee^d neuer project to

a This was the practise of Antipater, one of Alexanders Captaines, as Q. curt. repor- teih.

make himselfe great, strengthen himselfe with friends, or seeke to bee maister of greater riches, then is conuenient for his estate? Or if fortune haue cast all these things vpon him, that hee acknowledge continually, that hee hath receiued, gained, and gotten them, by the grace and fauour of his Prince, whose they are, whensoeuer he shall please to make vse of them? Or shall hee this way auoide his Princes displeasure, if he haue a speci-

c This was the practise of Ioh. Davids Ge- nerall.

all care to attempt or do nothing, without consulting with, or obtaining the consent of his Prince, though otherwise hee were assured that hee could preuaile in his attempts, and that it would turne to the good of his Country? Or shall hee this way shunne it, if being for a certaine time made Deputy, Lieutenant General, or raised

and

and euered to any other speciall place and dignitie, he^f forth-with at the end , and expiration of his time resigne his office to his Princes hands, and in no wise seeme to be desirous that it be prolonged, or continued vnto him, least hee should seeme to be sick of the swelling humours of Ambition? Or may hee this way auoide it, if hauing wonne, and prouing victor in diuers battels, hee impute the glory of his Conquests to the good fortune of his Prince , desiring that the victorious Army may now bee led by some other, whom the Prince shall thinke good of, and retiring, put himselfe into his Princes protection , carrying himselfe in a moderate fashion, as free from pride and ambition? By this onely meanes a great Generall, though suspected and feared of his Prince, may so mollifie and lenifie his minde, that hee shall haue no cause to thinke ill of him , but shall make to himselfe great and apparant reasons to reward him for his good seruices.

10 It may further bee demanded, why euery Kingdome is so fickle and unstable?

Is it because that euery^g Principality is the ob-
iect of Fortune, who can never be daunted, but
challengeth the like priuiledge against Empires,
as Emperours. Or may this bee the reason rather,
because it is exposed to such, and so many hatreds,
as the Tragical^h Poet sung , The Maker of the
world coupled these two together; Hatred and a

^g Sen. Oedip.
^{Idem. etiam Ep.}

xcij.

^h Senec. Theb.

^h Attius.

Kingdome. Or may this be the cause, for that it is
subiect to so many^h treasons, treacheries, &c. for
there bee very many in a Kingdome which bee
naught and vnfaythfull, few good?

2-6
1-4
ⁱ Setec. Theb.

11 To the same purpose it may bee demanded, why
among the Grecians and Romanes, ⁱ a Kingdom
was so hatefull for the most part?

1-2
2-6^k Idem Agam.

Did this come to passe by reason of the^k man-
ners, and crooked dispositions of their Prin-
ces, who being (for the most part) licentiously gi-
uen, thought it was a great pledge of their King-
dome, and badge of their Royaltie, that it was law-
full for them to do that which no body else might?

^l Idem in Hip-
polito.

Or being selfe-wild, or proud, ^l accounted it no
lesse dishonour vnto them, to be drawne to yeeld
to any thing (though neuer so iust) against their
wils, then to be vanquished in battell? Or is not the
fault so much in the dispositions & wils of kings, as
in the harsh^m natures of the Subiects, being stub-
borne, refractory, and hardly wonne to yeeld due
obedience? For no man willingly, would draw in
another mans yoake.

ⁿ Cicero pro
eluent.^p Arist. s. Polit.

12 Seeing that authority is as it were theⁿ spirit by
which every Common-wealth is governed, being
flatly opposed to contempt, which may bee called
the^o bane and destruction of all Kingdomes, it
may be demanded, how a Prince may behau him-
selfe, that hee neither fall into contempt amongst
his owne Subiects, or forraigne States?

Shall

SHall he effect this, if the ^p fashion of his go-
uernement proue not too remisle, and gentle,
whereby he may be thought to be negligent in or-
dering affaires of State? Or shall hee performe it
the rather, if hee ^q shew no leuity in the forme of ^q *Idem Ibidem.*
his gouernment, but constantly gourne, accor-
ding to the Lawes and Decrees of the Common-
wealth? Or shall he effect this likewise, if he shew
himselfe firme in his purposes, constant in his pro-
mises, and that hee hath no ^r notable touch of mu-
tability in his disposition? Or shall he bring this
to passe, if (curiously) pondering things past, ex-
pending, and well weighing things present, and
prouidently fore-seeing things to come, hee doe
timously consult, and determine, to bestow ho-
nours on ^s such men, as for their worth haue de-
serued; not vpon euery fawning and obsequious
fauourite, or such as can purchase them with mo-
ney? Or may hee doe this the better, if Fortune
proye a mother vnto him, and not a step-dame?
Or shall he finally effect this likewise, if he first ^t re-
presse his owne lusts, and inordinate affections,
giuing thereby his Subiects examples to follow
him in the like, and causing Forreigners to admire
him therefore?

13 It may be further demanded how an Empire, or
Kingdome may be finally lost?

Commeth it thus to passe, by a kind of a ^u fatall ^u *Tholoz lib.22*
necessity, when this or that State hath come ^{de repub.}

to his ful period? or not so, but rather for this cause, for that many, though they know how to conquer, yet haue not the meanes to manage the estate they haue conquered; or if they did, want (notwithstanding) power and meanes to retaine it in obedience, whereby it must needs come to passe, that they must loose their new-gotten Dominion? Or may this rather bee the cause, for that it often-

* This was ver- times falleth out, through the * corrupt manners rified in the Romanes pos- of the conquered, that the home-bred Subject is fessing *capua*, infected by them, and so, by little and little, dege- nerating into wantonnesse, giue occasion to some neighbouring war-like Prince to inuade them, and take away their whole Dominion? Or rather may this bee the reason, for that the Conquerour doth not gouerne the conquered according to their

¶ The fault of ^y auncient Lawes and Customes, but seeketh by Tarquinius Su- perbus. all meanes to abolish the same? Or is it for this

^z This is assig- cause, for that the Prince neglecteth the ^z exercise ned by Machi- auel, lib. de Prin. cap. 24. to of Military Discipline: or if he do professe it, yet doth it so coldly, as no good redoundeth to him- bee the cause selfe, or the Common-wealth thereby? Or further why the Prin- cies of Italy lost might this bee the cause, for that the Prince is ha- their Seignio- ted of his Commons; or hauing thē to his friends, ries.

yet cannot secure himselfe, or his estate, from the

^a This was the error of Lewis ^b may this be the reason, for that hee ^a permitteth ^a the 12. King of forraigne Prince to bring too many, and too France, in per- permitting Pope great forces into his Kingdome, whereby first sei- Alexander the zing of this or that place, at their pleasures, by lit- & to possesse tle and little they become Maisters of the whole? Flaminia.

S E C T. I. C H A P. V.

Of Councell, Councillours, and
the choosing of them: Of run-
ning middle courses, the good
which redoundeth to a Prince
being well aduised, and counse-
led, and how he should discerne
good counsell from bad aduice.

I It may be demanded how a Prince may behauie him-
selfe in choosing of his Councillours, that hee be not
deceived in his election?

SHALL he best effect this, if he
choose them from among
his ^a home-bred subiects? or
shall hee doe it the better if
withall hee make choyce of
such as be ^b faithfull, of ho-
nest life and conuersation,
generally skilfull of the ^c na-
tures, matters, and passages of other Countries,
and in particular, skilfull in the lawes, customes
and natures of his owne? ^d For it were a shame for

^a Tholoz. lib. 24.

^b Plin. Paneg.

^c Arist. 6. Ethic.
Cap. 27.

^d Cicero 2. de
orat.

a Councellour to a Prince to be skilfull of the customes of other nations, and to be a stranger in his owne Common-wealth: or shall he compasse this the better if he make choyce of ^c graue and ^f auncient men, as also of such as haue ^f beene to sed and tried with the variety of Fortune, hauing therby learned to carry themselues both in weale & woe? Or lastly, shall the Prince neuer admit of any for his Councellours, but such as ^g generally are accounted wise and vertuous? For particular men may deceiue and bee deceiued, but no one man can deceiue all men, neither hath any man bene deceiued of all men.

^e Plin.Paneg.

2 *Againe it may further be demanded, how a Prince may behaue himselfe in his Consultations, that he may grow wise thereby, and so be accounted?*

^b Capitulinus de
Marco Antonio.

SHall hee effect this, if hauing wise Councellours to aduise him, hee apt and accomodate himselfe to follow their dire&tions, and what they haue maturely deliberated and concluded vpon, hee forthwith put in practise and execution? Or shall hee better effect this, if sitting in Councell himselfe, he propound, and heare them with patience and discretion debate the matter, and ^b neuer seeme to be angry, or striue to maister and ouer-rule their opinions, though they determine cleane contrarie to his owne humours, minde and desire? Or shall he rather bring this to passe, if being able to ⁱ containe himselfe, and keepe close his owne

ⁱ Vigetius lib.3.

owne Counsels and intentions, he doe (indeede) propound what ought to bee done to all, or the most of his Counsell to consider of; but what he will doe, to communicate it with very few, or rather none, but aduise onely with himselfe? Or shal he rather performe this, if he grant free liberty of speach, neither doo too much affect those ^k soft and silken words of the Court, which his flatterers will be ready to claw him withall; knowing that they will please his humours? Or finally shall hee effect this, if with indifferencie, and all alike equality, he heare euery mans opinion, neuer ^l rewarding any councelling well, least for the hope of gaine, they might vpon sinister respects (at any time) decline from the right, nor ^m punish any (though they should counsell ill (so they do it not ⁿ Quint. Curt. lib. 3. lib. 3. of maliciousnesse) for so he shall euer want Counsellours, if it be dangerous to giue counsell?

3 It may further be demanded, why it is so exceeding auailable to a Prince, to haue his counsels and determinations kept secret?

IS it because that if they were ⁿ knowne, they might be preuented and hindered? Or is it for this respect rather, because his honour and estimation both at home and abroad, is thereby much increased and augmented? Or not so much for the former reasons neither, but for that if his determinations were once knowne, ^o many men pricked forward with envy, would detract from his wise-

dome

The first Part of the

dome, blaming him that hee put not his intentions sooner in execution, though hee could not (happily) finde fit opportunity seruing thereunto?

4 It may further bee demanded, what course a Prince might best take, that hee might not erre in his Consultations?

*S*Hall he performe this, if hee fully vnderstand
P Tholoz lib. 24.
g Guicchardine
Idem.
 the nature of the businesse, which is to be deliberated vpon? Or shall he do it the better, if vnderstanding the matter whereof to consult, hee constantly determine with himselfe rather to respect (cautelously) the extremes, and finall ends of busynesses, then to regard middle courses, much lesse to run them? Or shall hee also effect this, if hee obserue and marke how wisely and prudently his aduersarie (if any he haue) behaueth himselfe in those things, which concerne his honour, profit or safety? Or shall he rather accommodate and apply his counsels to the nature, manners and condition of his aduersarie, and by that meanes learne out and expiscate what might be likely that he will attempt against him? Or shall hee compasse these things the better, if in all his counsels and deliberations concerning the Common-wealth, he rather propound to himselfe how the honor, dignitie and splendor thereof may bee augmented, then what profit might thereby redound vnto it?

5 It may further be demanded, what is chiefly required of Senators, that they may give wholesome counsell.

May they effect this, if they be¹ men fearing God, making his plaine & euен lawes the strict and straight rule of their consultations? For seeing it is² God alone, which sustaineth and up-holdeth Common-wealths, it were very fit that he should be made the chiefe head, and director of the counsels thereof. Or may they do it the better, if standing for the³ libertie of themselues, and the Common-wealth, they do stoutly and couragiouſly, not faintly and fearefully pronounce and deliuere their mindes and opinions, least they might rather be thought to runne with the Fortune of the Prince, then with him, or the good of the Common-wealth? Or may they also effect this, if they shew themſelues⁴ modest, and of a quiet disposition? Or may they likewise effect it the better, if they can⁵ keepe their owne counſels? For it is very certaine that no great matter can be looked for at his hands, who will vent what hee should hold in? Or finally, may this better be performed, if choyce be made of ſuch Councillors which haue⁶ no particular interest in thoſe things which are to be consulted vpon? For no man in his owne cause, can ſpeak, thinke, or iudge uprightly, because every man therin will be partiall.

6 Considering that middle courses (for the moſt part)

H proue

¹ Plin. Paneg.

² Tholoz. lib. 24.

³ Tacit. 1. His.

⁴ Tacit. 3. His.

⁵ Quint. Curt.

lib. 4.

⁶ Tholoz. lib. 24.
de repub.

The first part of the

prone vnfortunatē, it may be demanded why notwithstanding the running of a middle course being propounded by some one or other in pubicke deliberations, it is (most what) embraced, followed, and put in execution?

^a Fran. Guich.

Commeth it to passe through the ill^a dispositiōn and worse affection of some addicted to faction and opposition, who perciuing that their owne conceits cannot passe currant, had rather giue way to, and allow of that which is worse, nor extreame (least hee should seeme to oppose) but different in a lesse distance, that thereby they may seeme to haue (in part) assented?

^b Idem.

Or is it not for this reason alone, but for thac likewise the other aduisers,^b least they should displease some prime-man, who hath propounded a middle course of proceedings, will likewise run a-long with him, and approue of his deuile? Or rather is this the reasoñ why such middle courses are by some no sooner propounded then approued, because (for the most part) prouident and wary, especially auncient and aged Statists, do approue of that course which they imagine to bee least violent and dangerous, and incline to the meane, as being the sweeter and more passable without noyse or Nuissance.

7 Seeing that the close minds, wils and ends of Counsellours be strange, diuers, and for sinister respects, privately kept to themselves, for (oftentimes) upon

pro-

pounding of matters to bee consulted vpon,^c one thing is spoken, another thing thought and meant, whereby the mindes and opinions (onely) of others may be discouered; it may here be demanded, how a Prince may iudge whether his Councillours aduise him well or no?

SHall hee know this by the^d disposition of the Councillor? For he that more respecteth himself then his Prince, & in the carriage of any matter regards his owne priuate more then the good of the Common-wealth, as long as hee beareth this minde, he can neuer proue a faithfull Councillour, nor one whom the Prince or State may trust or rely vpon. Or shall hee vnderstand this by the^e frequent vse & experience he hath had of his Councillours in the like businesses falling out ill, or well? Or shall he rather come to the knowledge hereof by making an^f exact search and disposition how matters are carried and disposed of within his owne territories? Or shall he rather come to this knowledge by the frequent reading of Histories? or by the apprehending or comprehending of these two Principles, *What is Profitable, What is Honest*. Which two indeed are the bounds and grounds of truth, and of that worthy wisedome and iudgement which ought to be in a Senator.

^c This was the practise of Tirlton Arch-bishop of Canterbury, against Edward the second, by whose aduice his son was sent into France, who ioyning with his mother & Mortimer, became the head and Captaine of the Rebels against his owne father.

^d Mach.in Prin.
^e Tholoz.lib.24.

^f Idem ibidem.

Sect. I. CHAP. VI.

Of Example, the vse and abuse
thereof in a Common-wealch.

^{a claudian.} 1 It may bee demanded, why subiects (for the most part) ^b frame & conformethemselues to the fashion of their Princes?

^{c Plin.Paneg.}



Sit for that both the ^b eyes of the minde, and the body, (for the most part) looke vpwards, and stand (as it were) at gaze at greatnessse and e'minencie, tending and bending the whole man to *dance* as they pipe? Or is it because

^{e Tacit.3. Annal}

^c Examples vrge and enforce more then Lawes can do, seeing it is the nature of man, rather to be led of his owne accord; then to be cōpelled? Or is it rather for that ^d Example in Princes is a kind of secret law? For it fareth and falleth out thus (for the most part) with their acts, that what they doe, they euē seeme to command it.

<sup>d Quintilian
decl.4.</sup>

^e Againe it may be demanded, why in reforming of a Common-wealch, the producing of examples of the ^{most}

most famous and illustrious men, for vertue in the same do very much auaile?

IS it because that such men being compelled by no Lawes, yet of their owne accord, and free-will, acting, exercising, and exhibiting, singular and rare examples of vertue, do excite and stirre vp such as bee good, to follow them, and those which are bad, they doe either make them ashamed, or discourage them from going on in their lewdnesse? Or is it rather for this, that when by long processe of time, there hath bene no exemplary punishment inflicted vpon offenders, men grow regardlesse of Lawes, and the number of delinquents so increase, that the Magistrate is afraid to punish them? Then one *Manlius Torquatus* to punish his owne sonne; or a *Quintus Fabius* to bee accused and condemned for ioyning batell with the enemy, without the *Dictators* leaue; and such examples, do much bridle and represso other mens insolencies.

3 It may further bee demanded, why hee that iudgeth by examples is commonly deceived?

IS it for that all the selfe-same reasons and circumstances in the like actions, do seldome, or never concurre, and meete againe? Or is it because the like actions are not alwaies gouerned with the like wisedome and discretion? Or may this bee the reason rather, because Fortune at all times,

times, playeth not her part alike, but now and then faileth her fauorites?

S E C T. I. C H A P. VII.

Of Wits, Manners, and Dispositions: of diuers Cities, Countries, and Nations, as well free as seruile.

- I It may bee demanded what kind of wits, may bee termed the best wits.

Guiccb.

Idem.



A y such bee counted for the best, which are ^a more stirring, sharpe, and acute, fiery and subtile, then ordinary? But these noble and excellent wits (for the most part) do proue very crosse, and are oftentimes the cause of much disquietnesse, turmoile, and trouble to him who is indued therewith. Or may those rather bee taken for the best, which though ^b more blunt, yet are more certaine and lasting, and (for the most part) are more fortunate then the other?

- 2 It may further be demanded, why in one and the selfe-

selfe-same Citie, there may be found many distinct families, whose manners and conditions are particular to themselues; as wee read amongst the Romanes, that the Manlij were euer sterne and severe, the Publicolæ courteous and gentle, the Ap-pij proud and ambitious, &c.

C Ommeth this to passe, by reason of the diuersity of their temperatures? But that (as it may bee thought) might be changed and altered, by the variety of Marriages. Or may this rather be the cause, for that euery Family hath a peculiar manner of bringing vp their children? for this commonly holdeth true, ^c whatsoeuer manners and opinions, are instilled into the minds of youth in their infancy, they will hardly or neuer bee remoued, but continue with them euen to their old age.

^c Mach. Disput.
de Repub. lib. 3.
cap. 46.

3 It may bee further demanded, why ^d diuers Nations, at the first assault, or onset giuen, seeme to bee magnanimous, and very fierce and forward to the battell, but within a while after doe grow very fearefull, and turne Cowards?

^d Liu. in his
bookes affir-
meth this of
the French-
men.

M Ay the cause consist in any peculiar affect in their natures? But it is possible that ^e nature from day to day, may bee cor- rected and amended? Or might this rather bee the reason, that such Nations being ^f without order ^g Idem Ibidem. or exercise of Military Discipline, are not ena- bled

^e Mach. disput.

Cap. 36.

bled with such ordinary manhood, as may establish their hearts and mindes, making them to conceiue an assured hope of victory, and therefore if they be not vanquishers in the first assault, they straight waies quit the field? And this (under correction) I take to be the true reason of their scarefulness and running away.

4 It may further bee demanded, wherefore divers men(euen lewd persons) having many times occasions offered them, to commit some memorable and notable villany, notwithstanding (for the most part) they dare not attempt it, or put it in practise, and execution?

⁸ Mach. disp.
lib. I. cap. 27.

[¶] Idem Ibidem.

[¶] Idem Ibidem.

¶ Is it for that they are afraid least they should ⁸ incurre the note of infamy? But the greatnessse of the thing, might (happily) couer the badnesse of the fact, and likewise prote^tt the party from danger. Or do they abstaine from perpetrating and committing such horrtble villany, by reason of their ^h owne in-bred goodnessse, or nice touch of their conscience? But such godly and holy motions do neuer enter into the hearts of such lewd lossels. Or may this rather bee the reason, for that by nature, it is not affoorded to the most men, to be ⁱ absolutely euill, or perfectly good?

5 It may further be demanded, why there should bee such, and so great difficulty, in chaunging or amending old customes, though most men (convicted secretly,

cretly in their consciences by evident truth) should confess they were altogether unprofitable, and dangerous to the Common-wealth to continue them?

May this bee the reason, for that although some good Citizens, or Patriots, foreseeing the danger, do perswade the change thereof, yet they should not be able fully to turne the peoples mindes, by reason of others oppositions? Or may this rather be the cause, for that most men stand so affected, and affectionated, to their auncient course of liuing, that they would not willingly depart there-from? Or may this bee the reason of the difficulty of amending euill customees, for that there is euer a want of proportionable meanes agreeable to the Lawes, to bring that businesse about, so that they must bee driuen to flic to new courses altogether, which seldom proue fortunate? Or may this rather bee the reason, for that if some few, or any one man, should go about to change the forme of gouernement, it should bee necessary for him, first by force to inuade the State, and then to seize the liberties thereof into his hands, which might bee thought not to bee the part of a good man, and therefore hee will rather desist from his purpose, then do his Cittizens so much good? Or may this bee a further reason, for that the most men are perswaded, that there can scarcely be that man found, who having once brought a State vnder subiection, by ill

I meanes,

The first part of the

meanes, would afterwards vle that power and authority which hec had so ill gotten, to the benefite and good of the people?

S E C T . I . C H A P . V I I I .

Of Benefites, and when to bee bestowed: Of Ingratitude , and how a friend may be purchased that a man may trust vnto.

I It may bee demanded when Benefites are to bee bestowed vpon a man?



a Mach. disp. lib.
primo, cap. 23.

R E they to bee collated vpon him ^a just at that time , when the bestower of them is compelled so to doe, as needing the present help of such a man, or for some priuate end to himselfe best knowne? But this manner of giuing should seeme to be very extrauagant, and distastefull, to the receiuer , as thinking that they were collated vpon him by reason of the parties necessity, which once serued, he would neuer conferre more vpon him. Or are they not so to bee collated vpon any man, but ^b timously rather, before hec which may haue

b Idem Ibidem.

haue need of them, shall haue occasion to vse them, or the Collator thereof the person?

2 It may further be demanded, wherefore they who haue^c best deserued of a Common-wealthe are (oftentimes) worst recompenced and requited?

Is this the reason, for that^d there is nothing lesse lasting then the very name of a Benefite? Or is this rather the cause, for that it is^e appropriate and peculiar to certaine Common-wealths, so to enuy those which excell in vertue and goodnesse, as they themselues being not able to follow and imitate them therein, seeke to spoile them of their gouernement and Empire? Or may this rather be the reason, that some^f standing too much vpon their owne merites, haue borne themselues too proudly against the State, or their owne society? Or might this likewise bee the cause, for that those, who either by their rare exploits, or cuning ambition, creepe into the fauour of the people at home, and hunt after renoure and admiration abroad, may seeme to dimme the glory of their Princes, who greatly desire to be accounted well-deseruing of their owne people, as those to whom it more properly belongeth, and therefore they must needs oppose such, and grow in distaste of them? Or is it for that all men generally by their owne corrupt nature, are lesse prone, prompt, and ready to requite a good turne, then to reuenge an iniury? Or may this rather bee the

^c As Charondas amongst the Æginetians, Themistocles amongst the Athenians; Camillus, Scipio, &c. among the Romans, were imprisoned, banished, or put to death.

^d Pindarus.

^e This was proper to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.

^f Philip. Comin.

The first Part of the

Upon this very conceite the *Venetians* put to death *Lauderanus*, because hee pacified a commotion by his owne authoritie; as Petrus *Bem bus* reporteth in his *Venetian History*.

reason for that the Prince, or State, groweth into suspicion of such kinde of men, least they should affect innouation, or seeke to tyrannise?

3 It may further bee demanded, why kindnesses, and good will, are oftentimes requited with ingratitude, and unthankfulness?

Is it because that he which neither can, nor hath any desire to remunerate him, to whom hee is so much indebted, will either forget them, or perswade himselfe, and the world, that no such kindnesses were offered vnto him, or receiued by him? Or may this be the reason, that those men, who haue beene (as it were) driuen, and by fatall necessity compelled to receiue kindnesse of other men, should afterwards grow ashamed of it, that they should bee thought to haue had neede of such meanes?

4 Seeing that no man can deny, but that the use of friends is such, and so great, that many times a man may bee driuen to relye his whole estate thereupon; It may bee demanded, how a man may bee ascertained, that hee hath purchased a true friend?

*S*Hall hee giue confidence to him, whom hee hath bound by grace and benefites? Or shall hee trust him, who hath any waies neede of his helpe? Or shall hee rather repose his confidence in

Guiccardine.

in him who is boundⁱ vnto him, by hauing e-^{i Pindarus.} quall profite and share in any businesse, which they shall ioyntly attempt and obtaine?

SECT. I. CHAP. IX.

Of Estimation and Credit, of Authoritie, publique and priuate, Seueritie, strictnesse of Gouernment, Constancie, Pietie, and Prouidence.

I Seing Authoritie is the prop of kingdomes, and that it is of the most men confessed, that the maiesty of an Empire consisteth in the splendor, grace, and defence thereof: it may bee demanded, how a Prince might beget such a reuarent opinion of himselfe amongst his subiects, & forreigners likewise, whereby he might become both admired and feared?

 Hall he effect this, if he institute such a forme of gouernment, which is^a seuere,^{a Cicero promi-} constant, and strict, bearing lone.
an hard hand ouer those whom he ruleth? Or shall he attaine therunto the better, if hauing^b hom e-bred strength & forces, he con-^{b Mach. Prin.} tinually^{& Theloz.}

tinually keepe them about him, and haue them in
a readinesse? Or if he be destitute of such forces,
doe straight wayes take a course to prouide them
else-where? Or shall he compasse this the rather,

^c claudian. 3.

^d So Ferdinand
King of Spain,
and Henry the
⁵ King of Eng-
land, grew fa-
mous.

^e Mach. Prin.
Cap. 21.

if he excell other Princes in the ^e integrity and
soundnesse of his manners, fashions, and good
conditions? Or shall he yet the better effect this,
if hee delight still ^d to be in action, and grow fa-
mous for well performing of what hee vnderta-
keth? Or shall he likewise obtaine his purpose, if
in cases of difference betwixt Princes, he ^e cut off
all respects of *Newtrality*, and declare himselfe for
one of them? Or shall he this way come to his
ends, if he giue this testimony to the world, that
hee is a louer of vertue, honouring all excellent
men, of what sort and Art soever? Or finally, shall
he this way compasse his desires, if hee giue in-
couragement and hope to his subiects whom hee
gouerneth, that they shall liue quietly vnder his
protection, and peaceably go about their affaires
and busynesses, in what kinde soever they shall
traffique or deale?

2 It may further be demanded, wherefore it concer-
neth a Prince so deeply to be highly esteemed both
at home and abroade?

^f Fran. Guiccb.

^g Idem.

IS it for that ^f estimation and authority once
lost (which may easily be done) can hardly or
neuer be recouered againe? Or is it for that ^g esti-
mation and authority in martiall affaires, is of so
great

great consequence, that the effecting of any businesse of import, doth wholly seeme to depend thereupon? Or may it be for this reason rather, that it shall be much more difficult for him whose credit and estimation beginneth to decay to defend himselfe and his estate from the least dangers, then for him who keepeth vp his estimation, and hath it imprinted in the hearts of his subiects or souldiers, to effect great matters, though his meanes be weaker? Or may it be for this reason likewise, for that it sometimes importeth a Prince to set his authority vpon the tentors, and stretch it beyond his ability for the effecting and performing of some great enterprise? Now a Prince shall neuer bring this to passe, vnlesse his subiects and souldiers be perswaded, that his power, authority, and estimation, is greater then (indeed) it is; but if they be thereof once perswaded, he shall haue that done readily, freely, and of their owne accords, which otherwise he should neuer haue had granted, much lesse extorted from them against their wils.

3 It may further be demanded, how a Prince may compass it to be feared of his subiects, and withall get himselfe great reputation thereby?

SHall he doe this, if he vse them ^h rigorously, ^h Fran. Guich. and oftentimes inflict seuere punishments vp-on them? For they will easily be brought to stand in feare of him, whom they know both can and will.

The first part of the

³ Guiccardine. will correct them, and bring them into order, especially if they perceiue him by his naturall inclination, to be thereunto addicted. Or shall hee finally effect this the rather, if he neuer vse a strongerⁱ medicine, then the nature of the disease, or strength of his sicke subiects are able to beare?

4 It may further bee demanded, how a subiect may gaine himselfe reputation with the common people?

^k Mach. disp.
cap. 34.

SHall he doe this, if he be^k descended of noble Auncestors, who haue approued themselues braue and excellent men in the carriage of themselves, and managing of great actions? Or shall he do this the rather, if he betake himselfe to a wise and well settled course of life, conuersing with none (as neere as he can) but with excellent men, and such are vertuous? Or shall he yet effect this the better, if in his younger yeares he shall performe any thing, either publickly or priuately, which in it selfe is memorable, and withall is honest? Or shall he attaine thereunto likewise, if being trusted with the^l managing of publique afaires of his Countrey, he discharge himselfe well thereof, hauing rather an eye that his actions may redound to the good of the common-wealth, then to his owne or other mens priuate, how neere or deere soever they may be unto him, or himselfe to himselfe?

^l Mach. Prin.
cap. 21.

6 It may further be demanded, wherfore the Romans thought

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thought it necessary, that their Generals of the field managing Armes amongst forraigne Nations, should haue free libertie to dispose of those affaires according to their owne best liking.

WAs it for that the^m Senate did well vnderstand, that if they commanded their Generals should attempt nothing without their directions, aduice and priuities, it would be the next way to make them loose, idle, and lesse circumspect in exercising their charge and office? Or was this rather the reason, for that they were perswaded,ⁿ that the fortune of the warres were doubtfull, and that sometimes suddaine accidents might fall out, which might very much either aduance and further their designes, or greatly hurt them; which occasions (as they rightly deemed) he onely could take, vnderstand, and make aduantage of, who shoulde bee present when they were offered?

^m Mach. disp.
lib. 2. cap. 33.

ⁿ Idem Ibidem.

6 It may further be demanded, how the Authoritie and estimation of a Prince may bee made famous, if he should carry a strict band over his subiects, in ruling and gouerning them?

Should hee compasse his ends, if hee alone should retaine and keepe all the maine offices and busynesses of the crowne in his owne hands, so that all men should be enforced to looke vpon, and vnto him, as of whom onely they were to ex-

^o Tacit. 2. An-
nal. Liu. etiam
lib. 9.

K peat

pect all things which might doe them good? Or shall hee yet compasse his designes, if hee neuer prorogue, or continue any too long in an office, (especially in militarie affaires) least his substitute growing too proud, should work any thing which might turne to his preiudice?

7 It may further be demanded, why this or that Prince his gouernement is counted sharpe and seuere; when the rule of others is thought to bee very gentle and easie.

P Mach. disp. lib
3. cap. 22.

May this be the reason, for that some au-
stere man comming to the gouernement, doth wish, and hath (as it were) a longing desire to haue all men like himselfe? Or may this rather be the reason, for that such a man comming to fway the state, is commonly a valiant man, and therefore commanding great and difficult enter-
prises to be vndertaken by his subiects, vseth sometimes seueritie, whereby those things may be put in execution, according as they were coman-
ded them?

8 It may further bee demanded, wherefore it should bee needfull that that government should be strict and seuere, which should beget authoritie and esti-
mation to a Prince?

May this bee the reason, for that lenitie (for the most part) causeth contempt, and that in

in any corruption of manners it is necessary the
q subiect doe stand in awe, or be made to stand
in awe of his Prince? Or may this rather bee the
cause, for that ^r clemencie and remissnesse opens
the maine gappe to offending, when men are
perswaded ^s that they shall scape vnpunished?
For ^t who will feare him who alwayes keepeth
his sword fast locked in the scabbard, or for a lit-
tle ^u idlenesse suffereth the edge of his authoritie
to be blunted? Or may this rather be the reason, for
that the common people are euery way better
ordered, being compelled to do their duties, and
by keeping them in feare, then if all the clemen-
cie, courteous intreatie, and demeanor of the
Prince should be affoorded them?

¶ It may further be demanded, why the constant kee-
ping of one manner and forme of gouernment, must
needes much availe to make a Prince much e-
steemed?

May this bee the reason, for that (as all
innovation in a State is dangerous) the ^v Prince shall be put in fault, and greatly
blamed, if vpon changing any thing in the go-
uernement, it should not well succeed and pro-
per? Or may this rather be the reason, for that ^x ex-
perience hath taught vs, that those States and
Common-wealths are best gouerned, which affect
the least alteration of old customes and manners,
though they be not all of the best?

^q Salust. Lepid.

^r Cicero pro Mi-
lone.

^s Sen. i de Clem.

^t Cic. i. in Catil.

^v Tholoz

^x Thucid. lib. 6.

¶ It may further be demanded, why a godly and Religious Prince is held in great honour and estimation with the people?

^{r Tacit. 2. Annal}

¶ *S*it for that^r Pietie and Godlineſſe euен of it ſelſe is venerable, making Princes to ſeeme like Gods among their people? Or may this rather be the reason, for that the people are perfwaded that the^r Prince will not attempt or goe about any enterprizes, but ſuch wherein hee shall bee ſeconded by the helpe of Heauens?

^z *Liu* in his first book maketh mention, that *Numa Pompilius* conferred mightily with the *Nymph Egeria* &c.

SECT.

SECT. I. CHAP. X.

Of Glory and Renowne, the desire thereof profitable to the Common-wealth: Of Power and Greatnesse, and the acquiring thereof. Of Ambition and vnlawfull desire of raigning: Of eminent Citties, and their being free, for the most part, from practises of Treasons, Rebellions, Insurrections, Mutinie, &c.

It may bee demanded, what might bee the reason, that the vehement desire and thirst after glory and renowne, hath alwaies beeene praise-worthy, and held profitable for the Common-wealth, whereas the least desire of raigning, in any great Subiect, hath beeene condemned on all hands, and ever thought to bee dangerous and hurtfull to the State?

Sit because² the hunting after honour and renowne, eleuateth and raiseth a mans thoughts, and exciteth to noble and generous

Fran. Guiccb.

^b *Idem.*

nerous actions? Whereas contrarywise the ambitious, and boundlesse desire of ruling, proueketh a man to propound to himselfe dangerous courses, and to runne them though it be to his owne vndoing? Or may it bee for this reason likewise, for that hee which is of an ^b ambitious and turbulent spirit, regardeth neither right or wrong, of Soueraigne or Subiect, but vpon the least conceit to compasse his vnlawfull desires, engageth himselfe in factions, brawles, and quarrels, filling all mens hearts with feare, and disturbing the quiet of the State so farre, that as much as in him lyeth, he will rather hazard the safety of it, then desist from his barbarous enterprise? Whereas hee who is onely desirous of honour and renowne, neither feareth dangers, nor attempteth or alloweth of any lewd courses, whereby hee, or his, might bee branded with the note of infamy, or disgrace?

^c *Liuu lib. 2.*
Potency is the
high-way to
gaine authori-
ty.

2 It may further bee demanded, how ^c potency and greatness may bee acquired, whereby the authority of a Prince may bee made more illustrious and resplendant?

^d *Arist.Rhet.ii.
cap.16. & horat.
Serm.II.*

^e *Tacit.15. An-
nal.*

I S it to bee purchased with money, to whom ^d all things do stoope? Or is it to bee acquired by Armes rather? for this is an infallible rule, that large Empire and Dominion, is not gotten, kept, or maintained by ^e idlenesse, but by the vse and exercise of Armes, and Millitary Discipline? Or is it

it not gotten by these meanes alone, but by ^f firme counsell, and wary circumspection also? Or may ^{f Tacit. II. An.} it be attained vnto, by making ^g firme leagues, and ^{g Arist. Rhet.} sure peace with forraigne Princes? Or to con-^{ad Alex Cap.} clude, may it bee gotten by the ^h benefite of for-^{Ultim.} tune, who (most what) doth maruailously fauour ^{h Quint. Curt.} lib. 8. and aduance some speciall sorts of men?

3 It may further bee demanded, what might bee the reason that those men who are ambitious, and haue an itching desire to bee inuested with the gouernment of States, if they once bee euencted to some eminent place in the Common-wealth, ⁱ they are ¹ So it fared never contented, but striue and endeouour to rise with John of Gaunt Duke of Lancaster, and Thomas Woodstocke Duke of Gloucester, protectors of Rich. higher and higher, and if once they can surprize the State, they wil rather die, then come afterwards to leade a private life?

Commeth it thus to passe, for that all ^k men euuen by nature, are apt and prone to desire great matters, though they bee not so fitted and accommodated in themselues, to obtaine and keepe them? Now where the desire is more then the ability to get, the minde can neuer be at quiet, or contented with those things which already it doth enjoy. Or is it for that ¹ Ambition of it selfe ¹ Guicchardis blindeth the eyes of men, perswading them that their merites and deserts are greater then (indeed) they bee, and thereupon they affect and attempt strange matters, and run head-strong courses to their owne destructions oftentimes?

Or

Or may this bee the reason, for that hee who once hath had his temples circled with a Crowne, can neuer after brooke a priuate life, because Kings and Kingdomes, are euer to bee thought and beleeuued to exceed proportion?

4 It may further bee demanded, what man may rightly be censured and deemed to be ambitious?

Aul. Pol.

Tholoz. lib. 22

I Shee so to bee deemed and taken, who vnder ^{1^m pretence of amplyfying and enlarging the dignitie Royall, will seeke to dominere ouer others, and rule all things according to his owne lusts? without cause or reason, changing the auncient Officers (though neuer so honest) at his will and pleasure, and suffecting others into their places, whom hee well knoweth to be of his owne factiōn, and (when time shall serue) will fauour his party? Or may hee likewise be thought ambitious who with greatⁿ gifts, large promises, and all kind and friendly Offices, seeketh to conciliate and get the fauour and good will of the people, whereby hee may be one step higher to his rising?}

5 It may further bee demanded, why all the Arts, cunning and practises, by which ambitious men study to climbe to the height of greatnessse, are kept so secret, that they hardly or neuer burst out, or come to be knowne, till they haue obtained what they sought for?

Commeth

Commeth it so to passe, for that^o men do not by and by (and as it were vpon the sodaine) but by degrees grow ambitious; whose progresses being not obserued (except of some few) they may more easily deceiue and blind mens eyes? Or may this rather be the reason, for that the ambitious do alwaies^P vse some honest pretext whereby they may compasse their designes, as though all their actions did tend and bend to these ends, least the Common-wealth (forsooth) or them-selues should be wronged, when the truth is, that they striue to get the garland, that thereby they may both oppresse others, and the weale Publick?

• Mach. disp. lib.
prim. cap. 46.

P Idem. Ibidem.

6 It may further be demanded, how, and by what safe meanes it may be prouided for, that a man shall not grow too ambitious and insolent in a State, or if hee should, how his insolency may bee repressed, and nipt in the head, whilst it is yet in the bud?

MAy this bee effected, if there should never way be giuen, or meanes affoorded, to create or erect any such office, or eminent dignity in the Common-wealth, out of the which the State might haue cause to feare, least in processe of time, Tyranny might take her first rising, and beginning therefrom? Or may it rather thus bee compassed, if the State take heed, and with wary circumspection prouide, ^q that they never foster, ^q Aristophanes
cherish, or bring vp, any Lyons Whelpe, much in Ranis.

lesse the Lyon himselfe, within their Territo ries?

Or may it thus likewise be done, if such wormes,

^{¶ Tholoz.lib.22.} and moathis, which breed of too much moisture, and are wont to consume those things whereof they had their beginnings, bee choked or shaken off, before they come to any great bignesse, or

[¶] The errour of the Athenians and Florentines, that they would not doe after this Counsell.

^t The practise of Rich. the 2. against the Duke of Hereford, and Tho. Mowbray Duke

^{cf} Norfolke: For the King feared Heref. least (hauing the loue of the people) hee should haue vanquisht Mowbray, and so hee banished them both, and least also it might haue fallen out that the Duke of Heref. should haue gotten the victory, & so haue graced himselfe.

^{¶ Tholoz.lib.22.} ^{x Mach. dis.lib. I. cap.52.} Or may it thus likewise be done, if hindrance be given to his ambitious

tious designes, by the same waies, meanes, and instruments, which he himselfe vsed to climb to the top of his desires?

7 It may lastly be demanded, wherefore the more eminent Cities (as in particular it may truely bee instanced in, and of, this Honourable Citie of London) are generally free from plotting, practising, or contriuing any treasons, rebellions, insurrections, mutinies, &c. against the Prince, or State: when other more remote parts of the Kingdome, are, and euer haue beeene more subiect to put in practise such hellish projects?

Is it for that in the more famous and eminent Cities (where the Magistrates are commonly more carefull and watchfull then other where) the plotters of treasons and rebellions, cannot so conveniently conueene and come to together, to consult about their villanies, without being noted, obserued, and espied, as they may do vnder any colourable pretext, in the Countries neare adioyning, or other remote parts from such Cities? Or is it not for this cause alone, but for that in such eminent Cities (and in particular within this Citie of London) the word of God is more plentifully Preached, whereby the Citizens are better instructed in their duties to God and their Prince, then commonly they are in all the Countrie besides? Or may this bee a further reason for the said Citie of London in particular, for that as

So Iacke Straw his rebellion begun in Kent, in the time of Rich. the 2. who was slaine by the Right Honourable William Walworth, in Smith-field, whereby the Citie for that honourable seruice had the Dagger added to their Armes. So Iacke Cade his conspiracy and rebellion in Henry the 6. his daies, came from Kent likewise. So Kets conspiracie came from Norfolke in the time of Edw. the 6. So the rebellion in the North, was moued against Q Elizabeth of Famous memory by impious Pius Quintus B. of Rome. So the powder-treason was plotted & contriued in our Soueraigne Lord King James his

time, by diuers Gentlemen in seuerall Countries. But in all these there was neuer a Citizen in any of them.

well the chiefe Magistrate thereof, as other worthy Citizens therein, are nearer to the Court, and by reason of their eminent places, and prime Offices which they beare, and daily do execute for the Prince, and in his name, to the good of Towne and Country, haue (ever) more dependance of their Prince, then in other places further distant therefrom, the other subiects can haue: whereby it commeth to passe that they neuer desire innovations, nor engage themselves and their estates by plotting of treasons, raising rebellions, &c. but content themselves with their owne conditions, studying to loue, and to bee beloued of their Prince, which things are not so well performed by particulars, in places further distant therefrom, as hath beene shewed? Or, to conclude, may this likewise be the reason, for that the said Citie of London, being the Chamber of the Prince, wherin hee euer presumeth that hee may be most safe, the Citizens euен out of their loue and loyalty to their Prince, haue euer thought foule scorne that themselves should be found vntrue, or disloyall; or that themselves, or their Citie should be branded with the hatefull name of Traytors, or hauing treason, rebellion, or treachery, hatched in it?

S E C T. I. C H A P. XI.

Of Studies, dispositions, & whence the diuersitie thereof may proceed : Of Learning likewise, knowledge of tonges and Histories, how necessary & auailable they are in generall, but especially for a Prince, that thereby he may more cleerly see, and exactly iudge of his owne affaires. Of Intelligence, and the vse and benefit thereof.

→

¶ It may be demanded, whence the varieties of studies and diuersity of dispositions of men might proceed ?

Doth this diuersity happen by ^a reason ^a Fran. Guicch. of the varietie of times and places? Or not so neither, but by the mutabilitie of the vnstable multitude rather, of whom this Proverbe is truly verified, *So many men, so many mindes?* Or falleth it out

^b Tholozanus.

thus the rather, by reason of the ^b difference of yeares, and vnlikenesse of manners of the inhabitants of one and the selfe-same kingdome, the desires and ends of the Nobles, Senators, and people, being cleane contrary one to the other?

2 It may further be demanded, wherefore wise men haue in all ages greatly indeuoured to perswade all men to get learning and knowledge before any other thing?

^c Sen. Epist. 58.

VAs it because they plainly saw and perceiued, that it was the best meanes ^c to purge and purifie the mindes of men, whereby they might bee apted to receiue and retaine vertuous precepts? Or might this be the reason, for that they well knew, that the embracing of good letters was ^d the high-way to wisedome, by which the policie of a State is most aduanced?

^d Quintilian,
lib. 12.

3 It may further be demanded, wherefore the knowledge and skill of languages is necessary and profitable for all men, but especially for a Prince and priuy Councillour?

^e Guicch.

MAy this be the reason, for that all men are commonly well pleased to ^e vnderstand, & to be vnderstood of those with whom they shall chaunce to haue any dealing? Or may this be the cause, for that a man being skilfull in the tongues, can ^f better explaine himselfe and his owne

^f Comineus.

owne meaning, and shall much better bee vnderstood, then if he should deale by an Interpreter? Or may this likewise be a maine reason, for that many times it falleth out, that a priuy Councillor is to take notice of some serious businesses, which mightily import the State to know, and bee secret in, which things can never be related, and transacted so well, nor to such good purpose, if for want of knowledge of the tongues, the Councillor or Relator must of necessity vse the helpe of some third person? Or may the knowledge of tongues bee thought so auailable to a Prince or Statesman, for the entertaining and giuing audience to Embassadors, hearing of their messages, be they hostile or friendly, and giuing them their dispatches, answeres, and dismissions?

¶ It may further bee demanded, wherefore wise men haue bela^t the knowledge of Histories to be the readiest way whereby a man may become wise, calling History the life and soule of memory, the light of truth, director of mans life, &c?

5 Tacit. 4. An-
nal.

Cic. de Orator.

Diodorus Sicu-
lius.

comineus.

h Diod. Sicul. I.
Bibliorum.

¹ Plutarchus. in
Timolconte.

¶ Is it because that by reading of Histories, a man shall truely find^h *Virtue*, to haue her due praise, and honour giuen her, as contrariwise to *Vice*, her due shame and reproofe? Or may this bee the reason, for thatⁱ History is auailable to instruct any priuate man (of what degree soever) how to frame his life, and carry himselfe with commendation in the eye of the world, when, as in a glasse,

he

he shall see how to beautifie & compose it, according to the patterne of other mens vertues? Or may this bee a further reason, for that thereby a ^{*Livy lib. i.*} man may ^k become a Statesman, and know how to manage publique affaires, drawing his rules and directions out of old Antiquities, and times passed, as out of a Store-house, and making application thereof to the time present?

5 It may further be demanded, what may be the chiefe vse, benefit and end of Intelligence?

<sup>*Fran. Guiccb.
Aul. Pol.*</sup> **M**ay it be beneficiall to a Prince or State, because he may thereby ^l distinctly know the condition and state of all Countries, the power and strength of their Princes and Gouernors, the wisedome and skilfulness of their Senators, in managing the affaires of State, and the originals and continuance of their families, with many other particulars necessary to bee knowne to a Prince or State, who either hath, or may haue dealing with other Nations? Or may this rather be the chiefe vse & end of Intelligence, that a Prince or wise Statesman may thereby better ^m discouer the secret fraudes, and cunning practises of his faire tongued, and smooth-faced friends (but indeed his craftie and subtile aduersaries) as likewise the machinations, drifts, and intents of his open enemies, whereby he may better be enabled to explicate and winde himselfe out of dangers, or frustrate their intentions, by crossing and counter-mining of them?

<sup>*Polib.lib.I.
Pacuvius &
Guicb.*</sup>

S E C T.

Sect. I. CHAP. XII.

Of peace, and the conditions thereof: Of the State, and affaires of Princes: Of Embassages, Embassadours, and who are fittest to vndertake such charge: what Arguments are most perswasive, and of the great vse of Eloquence in a States-man or Embassadour.

I It may bee demanded, why wise-men haue alwaies thought peace to be expedient for both parties, as well for the victor, as those who haue beeene conquered?



I MIGHT it bee for this reason, for that they supposed it^a impossible ^{a Seric. Herc.} for the world to continue, if it ^{b Fur.} Should bee vexed with continuall wars? Or might this rather be the reason, for that they truely iudged that the^b conquered must of necessity, ac- ^{b Idem Ilidem;} cept

cept of what peace and conditions souuer the Victor shall grant them? And that they thought it likewise to bee a^c comely and gracefull thing to the conquerour, to affoord them peace vpon reasonable termes, that all men might take notice, that hee knew how to begin, and ingage himselfe in a iust warre, and was able likewise to make an end thereof? Or might not this be the onely reason, but for that they thought it^d profitable likewise, and safe for the Conquerour to lay downe his Armes, considering that if hee should still prosecute the warres, hee should reape nothing but wearisomenesse by continuing and protracting of them, and if hee should make too much hast, and as it were inforce an end of them, hee might runne himselfe into many and^e needlessse dangers, euent to the hazard of his owne estate, which otherwise hee might easily haue auoyded? For Fortune will sometimes play the Iade, and the euent of warres is vncertaine?

2. It may further bee demanded, how a safe and firme peace, may bee distinguished and knowne from that which is unsure and not to be trusted unto?

^f Liu. lib. 25. **M**ay this be knowne, if the peace bee^f honest, as putting an end to the warres, by giuing and accepting of tollerable conditons? Or may ^g Tacit. 4. Hist. it this way be knowne likewise, if it bee^g simple, plaine, and without false colours or glosses, ambiguity of words, or equiuocations, and not subiect

subject to what constructions the peace-breaker may wrest or draw them?

3 It may further bee demanded, why that Prince who came to his Kingdome by some of the Nobility, or Senate, shall more hardly keepe it, then another, who obtained the Crowne by the suffrages and assistance of the people?

IS it because that^h those of the Nobility think themselves to be little inferiour, or rather equall with the Prince, whereupon hee cannot sway the Scepter as him listeth, but must bee glad in the most things to be ruled by them? Or may this rather bee the reason, for that it will bee thought the Prince willⁱ never be able sufficiently to satisfie those Nobles, without the hurt and wronging of others, which when hee cannot, those very men, by whose aide and assistance hee got the Crowne, will bee the first who will pull him downe againe? Or may this be the reason, for that^k if the Commons should make head against the Prince, hee could never bee secured of his safety, or retayning of his Kingdome, because they would oppresse him with multitude, the Nobility being but a handfull to them?

^h Mach. Prin.
cap. 9.

ⁱ So fared it with the Duke of Buckingham, in the time of Richard the 3. with Charles the 8. and Lewis the 12. Kings of France, in the losse of Milane, &c. as reporteth Mach. Prin. Cap. 9.

^k Idem Ibidem.

4 It may further be demanded, wherefore it so much importeth a Prince to manage his Martiall affaires in his owne person, if hee euer looke to grow famous by his conquests?

¹ Quint. curt. Mach. Prin. So Alexander the Great, Ferdinand King of Spaine, and Hen. the 5. King of Eng. became famous.

² Mach. disput. lib. I. cap. 30.

IS it because it¹ so much encreaseth and augmenteth his estimation, and credit with foraigne Princes abroad, and breedeth and begetteth him loue and authority among his owne people at home? Or may this be the reason, for that by this meanes, all² wrangling occasions, and heart-burnings are cut off, whereby a Prince sometimes proueth vngratefull to men, euen of the best deserts? For when Princes are present, and behauie themselues brauely in the field, all the honour and glory thereof (as it pertaineth) so it redoundeth vnto them: whereas otherwise if they were absent, and committed the managing of those affaires to their Generals, they straight waies imagine, that if their forces should preuaile, the glory of the day should rest with the Generall, who led the Army, and that themselues can neuer challenge any part of the victory gotten, vnlesse they extinguish the merites of the Generall, or himselfe, and by that meanes proue vniust and vngratefull to their seruants.

5 It may further be demanded, how a Courtier may come to bee much employed in his Princes affaires?

May he effect this, if heⁿ should waite dili- ⁿ Guicch.
gently, and bee alwaies in the eye of the Prince? Or may hee compasse this the rather, if once employed hee manage that affaire well? For by this meanes, hee shall both gaine himselfe reputation, and bee thought fit and able to deale in any businesse, and be sure (almost) neuer to be out of action, by reason of the dependencies which other businesses haue vpon those, wherein hee formerly hath beeene employed.

6 Considering that by well or ill managing and handling of the affaires of Princes, in negotiating for them with forreigne Princes, either great good, or great hurt may accrue to the Prince and State, it may be demanded what manner of men a Prince might chiefly employ for Embassadours to forreigne Princes? *long now his oldation had
been finished*

SHall hee vse such as are^o skilfull to picke and ^o comineus.
gleane something out of other mens employ-
ments, and appropriate it to themselues, if there
bee hope that their credit and estimation, may
grow greater by it? Or shall not a Prince trust to
such to negotiate for him, but to thosse rather,
who are faithfull, carefull, meeke, and gentle, and
*now his oldation had
been finished*

haue beeene long practised and experienced in managing such affaires?

7 It may further be demanded, with what tooles an Ambassador shall soonest perswade a forreigne Prince, and draw him to fauour, and further his maisters designes?

P. Tholoz.

*Fran. Guiccb.
Comineus.
Mach. Prin.*

SHall he assaile him with^p firme arguments and sound reasons? But hee that is nice, and hath a speciall opinion of his owne wisedome, will presently distast that or any thing that is solide. Or shall he rather set vpon him with^q representations of colours, Popularities, and circumstances? And (to speake as the truth is) these are of no lesse (if they bee not of more) force, then firme and sound reasons: For circumstanees, colours, representations, and such like stuffe, are of such power and efficacy, that they can giue lifē to true and sound reasons, peruerter the iudgement, if it bee not stable and well grounded, and quickly leade into errour.

8 It may further bee demanded, why eloquence is so necessary for a Councillour, or an Embassador?

IS it because that daily amost it falleth out, that a Prince bath occasion to send some one or other

other of his Councell to forreigne States , either to perswade; to accuse, or defend; to gratulate, or condole, &c. Now it is both requisite, and necessary , and comodious for a Prince to bee furnished with men so qualified, with eloquence, vtterance, &c. as that they may with credit to him and his Court, well discharge the place, and person they sustaine ; And it should be a great shame, disaduantageous , and dishonourable to the Prince, if for want of such gifts, in any whom hee should send on such errands ; it should fall out otherwise. Or may it rather be for this cause; for that in pacifying such as are seditious in the State , and compounding the quarrels and differences of such as are factious , there is no better meane to accord them, then to vse an eloquent and plausible speech.

SECT.

Sect. I. CHAP. XIII.

Of Discord and Faction, whereof they take their beginnings, and of the nourishing, or not nourishing of them in a Common-wealth.

I It may bee demanded from whence discords and factions haue their beginnings?

^a Tholoz. de Re-pub. lib. 22.



Or they arise of such ^a motions as are sodainely suggested to the people, so that there cannot bee time giuen them to thinke or consider what matter they go about? Or do they take their begin-

b Idem Ibidem. 1032
Or open hatred of Familiars? Or may they proceed rather from the roote of ^c pride and ambition, whilst euery man striueth to proceed, and go before

^b Senec. Epist.

74.

before another, and is alwaies detracting from him hee liketh not? Or may they haue their beginnings from idlenesse and loosenesse of liuing, which oftentimes are wont to minister occasions of ciuill (or rather vnciuill) brawles and contentions? Or may they arise of the ^a different mindes and dispositions of the people, from the designes and intentions of the Nobility? Or not so much from thence neither, but of the waue-ring mutability of the vnconstant multitude also? their yeares being so diuers, and their manners so vnlike : For it is impossible, that where there is such and so great diuersity of ycares, and disparity of manners, that the multitude or Commons altogether, should equally well like of, affect, and comport the present State, but contrarywise disagree, grow factious, and contentious.

^a Tholoz. de R. pub. lib. 22.

2 It may further bee demanded, whether it may bee beneficiall to a Prince or State to nourish factions, or no?

IT were too hard a taske for mee (Right Honourable) to take vpon mee definitiuely to determine this question: for I am not ignorant that amongst diuers men, and those of the wisest sort, this doubt hath beene canuased, and greatly controuerted; yet seeing that I am entred into it, I thought it not fit altogether to passe it ouer in si-

lence, without shewing your Honour my priuate opinion therein, which that I may do the better, I will rip vp the Arguments on both sides. That factions (therefore) should bee nourished of a Prince or State, many things may induce and perswade thereunto, but especially these two, *e Mach. Prin.* *Honour and Profit.* For that Prince^e must needes *cap. 20.* bee honoured and feared, who alwaies hath an enemy at his owne deuotion, and neuer resisting his designes and enterprises : For hee that can conquer when hee list, is not onely admired, but much feared likewise, both at home and abroad. For all men with one voyce will giue it out, that hee got the victory by his owne valour and prowesse : Which so reported and beleeuued, there is no doubt but that hee shall bee much renowmed therefore, though he atchieued it otherwise; namely, by being seconded with a potent faction, ioyning with him against their owne Prince, or otherwise. Againe, that the chiefeſt and most potent Cities of a Kingdome, should be brought vnder the Princes subiection, it were not onely conduicible and necessary, but also profitable, both to him and the common-wealthe. Now to effect this, a Prince must either vſe force or policy. If hee say to compasse his designes by force, hee must of necessity offer many injuries to the people, which the more openly they are done, the more they do prouoke them to mislike the Prince: For that which the Law hath made Mine, and Thine, if it ſhould be snatched away from

from the Subiect, it would bee grieuously taken, and held for no better then an intollerable peece of iniustice. But when the^f Cities of themselues are become factious, and the Citizens doe waste and consume themselues by quarrels and factious, the fault shall neuer bee laid on the Prince, but on the factious, and yet by this meanes the Prince in effect, shall obtaine what hee desired. For the Cities hereby growing weake, and wearied with continuall garboiles, will willingly put themselues into the Princes protection, and yeeld themselues subiect to his will. Further, for a Prince to diuert the current of the warres, or any hostile inuasions, from his owne dores, it is very necessary, behouefull and conuenient: Now it is not incredible, that euer hee shall haue any better way, or meane to bring this to passe, then by^g nourishing factious, and dissentions in his enemies Countrie; for many haue put this in practise heretofore, and greatly thriuen thereby: Moreover diuers of the wifest sort, haue thought it very aduantageous to the Prince, that the^h Subiects should neuer come altogether, to consult, or agree altogether, vpon any thing which might tend to their common or particular safeties. To conclude,ⁱ that a great Prince, or Monarch, may become more wary of his enemy, and better conserue his owne estate, it hath beeene thought fit, by some of the wifest heads that euer haue beeene, that such a Prince should neuer bee without an enemy, or be a great nourisher of factious

^f Mach. dis.lib.

^{2.} cap. 25.

^g Herod. lib. 4.

Xenoph. de Pe-
dia Cyri. lib. 3.

^h Tacit. Agric.

ⁱ Tholoz. de Re-
pub. lib. 23.

ons in a forreigne Land: Which course, if *Rome* had taken, and not destroyed *Carthage*, they should haue had their braue spirited youth better trayned vp, practised, and made ready in feates of Armes, which might haue steeded the Common-wealth for offence or defence thereof; Graue and mature counsell should haue flourished in the Senate, the Citizens should not haue wasted theinselues with ciuill warres, and so the Empire should haue beene more durable and lasting. The reasons of those who hold it vnprofitable, and euery way disaduantageous to a

^k Mach. lib. 3. Prince, to nourish factions, are as follow. It is^k im-

possible, say they, by reason of an inbred incon-

stancy in the nature of men, that those factions, which at this, or that present, depend vpon a Prince, should alwaies, and after one and the selfe-same manner, bee so affected towards him, for that men being wauering, doe greatly desire sometimes this Prince, sometimes that Prince, to

^l Idem Ibidem. be their chiefe Patron. Againe,^l the nourishing of factions, by a Prince in a forreigne Land, is oftentimes the cause, that by little and little, discords and ciuill garboyles are brought into his owne Country, which will scarcely be thought to bee conuenient. Further, a great inconuenience,

or rather an apparant losse might happen to a Prince, who should nourish factions within his

^m Idem Prin. owne Dominions; For^m vpon any sodaine inua-

sion, such Cities of his, which should happen to bee rent asunder by factions, must of necessity

be

be all lost : For the ⁿ weaker part would rather submit, and apply it selfe to a stranger, then yeeld to the adueile faction in any thing. Moreover this course of gouerning, by nourishing of factions, must needs ^o argue the weakenesse, and imbecility of the Prince, both in power and judgement : For if hee were strong and prudent, hee would never indure that his Country should bee torne in peeces by factions and contentions. To conclude, seeing that euery faction consisteth of few or many, both of these must needs bee hurtfull to the Common-wealthe: This latter for that ^p they trusting to their owne strength, would ^r presently take Armes, and turne the quiet of the State into garboiles: The former likewise, though perhaps somewhat more secretly and slowly, would no lesse vexe and molest the Common-wealthe, by reason that ^q factions of the Nobility are wont to draw vnto themselues all, or the greatest part of the Commons, to take part with such or such of them, as they most affect. These things thus standing, they conclude, that factions are rather to bee extinguished and quenched, then nourished. For mine owne part (*Right Honourable*) though I will determine nothing of this matter, yet thus I thinke thereof. That Factions, to the singular benefite of the Prince, and Common-wealthe, may be nourished in a forreigne gouernement : and though it were not so conuenient (perhaps) they should bee set on foote, and maintained at home, yet at no hand are they to

ⁿ Tholoz. lib.de
Re pub. 23.

^o Mach. Prin.
cap. 20.

^p Lin.lib. 34.

^q Arist. 5. Polit.
cap. 4.

be neglected, especially in the time of peace. For seeing that there is no Common-wealth, which doth not breed and bring forth, yea foster and cherish some enuy and contention: these contentions may proue healthfull to the State of a Common-wealth, as Agues are sometime beneficiall to the state of a mans body: And it is certaine that the Romane Common-wealth, was neuer in better health and safety, then when the Tribunes of the People, and the Patricians were at variance: and the Lacedæmonian State neuer in better state, then when their Ephori, and their Kings could not agree. For by this curbing of one another, the publique Offices of a Common-wealth were better discharged, both at home and abroad.

SECT. I. CHAP. XIII.

Of Sedition, Mutiny, and defection, of the greatest part of the people in a State, and of standing Neutral, or part taking.

I It may be demanded whence sedition and mutiny, in, or, against a State taketh his beginning?



A Y it arise and spring out of the bitter^a roote of oppression, as when men apprehending the remedy of present euils and dangers, to bee the euils and dangers themselues, doe vpon a so daine breake out, and so

take Armes? Or may it proceede^b of feare as the Phylosopher well conceited? For feare may moue and incite men, to bee seditious, fearing or expecting punishments to be inflicted vpon them, for the wrongs they haue done, and by this meanes

^a Tholoz Aristotle 5.
^b Pol. Cap. 3. Idem Ibidem.

meanes running out, they thinke (or at least are willing) to preuent them before they can bee put in execution. Or may this proceed of too much indulgency, clemency, and remissnesse of the gouernement, together with the superfluity and abouundance of all things, it being rather the na-

^a *Livy lib. 2.* ^b ^c nature of the people to^c grow to bee Wantons then Warriours? Or may it come rather of ^d penury, and scarcity of things necessary? Or may it hap-

^e *Liu. lib. 38.* pen through the^c pride and ambition of euill Gouernours and Councellours? Or may it rather arise of taking vp too much mony at Vse, with the which the Commons being (as it were) eaten vp, and their states consumed, they grow desperate thereupon, and so take Armes, thinking ^f *Tacit. 1. Hist.* themselues most safe when they runne the most vncertaine courses? for worse then they are, they thinke they cannot bee.

2 It may further bee demanded, whether, when once sedition groweth hot, and commeth to Heads, it were better to stand Newtrall, then to fall to part-taking?

^g *Solon.*

^h *Sic refert A.* ⁱ *Gallius. in Not. Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12.* **T**ouching this Question (Right Honourable) vnlesse that^g great Athenian Law-giver, had decreed and established by Law, that vpon any sedition arising in that State, ^h he that would not take part with one side, should bee banished the Citie, and loose all that euer hee possessed; I should scarce haue thought it worth the looking into:

into: but after so wise a man had determined it, and for that I perceiued others, who thought themselues as wise, as the said *Law giuer*, did stiffely stand against his opinion, and vpon good grounds (as they suppose) produced arguments to the contrary, I thought it worthy my labour likewise, to put downe the reasons on both sides, and in conclusion to enterpone mine own priuate opinion touching the premisses. Those therefore who stand on *Solons* side, and allow and stand for part-taking doe thus argue :ⁱ If the good men, which be in the Citie or Common-wealthe, per-<sup>A. Gællius
noct. Attic. lib. 2.
cap. 12.</sup> ceiuing the *Seditious* to bee madded with fury, and to grow to an head, should apply themselues to either part, there is no doubt, but that they might bee a meanes to reduce them to vnity; perswading first with their owne side, how ill besee-
ming a thing it is, for Citizen to striue with, or take Armes against Citizen, and what destrucci-
on of them and theirs may ensue, if they suffer themselues still to be led with passion, and by that meanes mollifying their owne friends minds, they may (happily) get leauue likewise to deale with the other side, in those or such like termes, and so perswade both parties to lay downe their wea-
pons. Againe,^k those which take part with nei-
ther side, if the differences of the factious should once bee compounded, should smart for it, being hated on both sides, deemed as pub-
lique enemies, and such as solaced themselues, and rejoyced to see them at those oddes, and

O therefore

^k Phauorinus
Philofopus.

The first part of the

therefore are iustly expos'd to the prey, and iniuries of either party. Further, it were very dangerous when the Citie or Common-wealth is diuided into faction, not to take part with the one or the other side, least a¹ third faction should spring out of the others, as hath sometimes bee[n]e ready to haue falne out in the Iewes Commonwealth. But those which stand for newtrality, think otherwise, and thus they reason^m Ciuell Armes of themselves, can neither be prouided, taken vp, or managed by any good or lawfull meanes, and the issue and end of them commonly proueth naught. For the Leaders and Captaines of the seditious, vnder the pretence of seeking the good of the Commonwealth, do euery one seeke to promote his owne ambitious humours, and so draw the people to follow their fancies, which no good Patriote ought to do. Againe, it argueth great folly in any, who shal take either part, and ioyn with the seditious: for by that meanes theyⁿ strengthen and encourage them, encrease their malice towards their Countrey-men, and fellow-Citizens of the aduerse partie, and become partakers of their rebellions, madnesse, and folly. Touching mine owne priuate opinion herein, I think (right Honourable) that newtrality is regularly to be avoyded in either Prince or Courtier, except in some maine case, where a man by making shew to be newtrall, may more handsomly compouud and contrieue his owne busynesse, and better promote, and sooner come to his owne ends.

EINIS.

¹ *Iosephus de
bello Iudaico.*

² *Tacit. Annal.*

³ *Salust. in bello
Iugurthino.*

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